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Executive summary 
 
The free movement of workers enshrined in Article 45 TFEU is one of the fundamental 
principles of the European Union. Although Article 45 TFEU contains clear references to 
specific rights for workers, which have been implemented in several pieces of 
secondary legislation (e.g. Directive 2004/38, Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 as well as 
Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009), the key concepts regarding 
the scope of application of the free movement of workers derive from case law. 
 
Article 45 TFEU applies to migrant workers, i.e. persons performing services for and 
under the direction of another person in return for which they receive remuneration, 
provided their activity is not marginal and ancillary. This includes full-time workers, 
part-time workers (no matter how many hours worked), seasonal workers, frontier 
workers, working students and jobseekers. Article 45 TFEU does not apply to non-
remunerated work including voluntary work and care work within the family unit. It is 
open to debate whether it should apply to internships and other forms of non-
remunerated work which are aimed at facilitating access to the paid labour market.  
 
Migration exists whenever the worker has moved between EU Member States: this 
includes migration to another Member State to work there; returning to the home 
State after having worked abroad; and living in one Member State and working in a 
different one. Article 45 TFEU can be invoked also by employers to challenge 
restrictions on the possibility to hire workers. The family of the worker is also 
protected by both primary and secondary provisions of EU law. 
 
In order to be protected by the Treaty free movement of workers provisions a 
claimant must fall within the personal scope of the Treaty, i.e. he or she must fall 
within the definition of worker. Even though the concept of worker has been 
interpreted broadly, there are some grey areas, in particular in relation to employment 
which pursues an ulterior aim, such as social reintegration schemes. For the claimant, 
being classified as a worker is of paramount importance since the status carries a 
wealth of rights (non-discrimination, access to benefits, the unconditional right to 
reside in the host State). 
 
Work also needs to be remunerated, but the concept of remuneration is flexible so 
that a quid pro quo (such as board and lodging) might count as remuneration. 
However, certain work (internships, apprenticeships etc) is often of economic value for 
the employer, and of value to the person performing it; and yet, the fact that such 
activity attracts no remuneration might leave a vulnerable section of workers devoid of 
protection in European law. Next to that, Member States may police the definition of 
worker rather rigidly, so that those who work are in fact treated as economically 
inactive, and so subject to indirectly discriminatory rules that would not be justified if 
applied to workers. The Commission should be ready to challenge any restrictive 
practices in defining migrant work, which may result in significant detriment to part-
time workers. The same should be said in relation to atypical work contracts, such as 
zero-hours contracts, and there are also problems with the status of compulsory work 
placements in order to receive benefits. Therefore, given the changed landscape of the 
labour market, in order to determine whether there is an employment relationship the 
focus should be on whether the worker is able to refuse work offered (useful 
guidelines could be provided by national laws on the application of minimum terms 
and wages and similar), rather than on the remuneration.  
 
 
 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
The notions of obstacle and discrimination under EU law 
on free movement of workers 
 
December 2014   5 
The Commission should also be alive to measures that discriminate against migrant 
workers once they have become unemployed, challenging restrictive approaches to 
the retention of worker status which can result in sudden loss of social protection, and 
arguing that such restrictions defy the broad approach to be taken to defining workers 
under Article 45 TFEU. Where possible, it would be advisable to characterise migrants 
as workers in order to trigger the strongest obligations with regard to both indirect 
discrimination and obstacles to movement. Measures that appear to be directed at the 
economically inactive can have significant effects upon migrant workers, increasing 
the disadvantages of becoming unemployed, even though many migrant workers 
move between jobs, and so making their work more precarious. The use of Article 45 
TFEU in the context of access to the labour market, and an empirically evidenced, 
broad approach to benefits necessary to subsist, and so make access to the labour 
market possible, could help to avoid a situation in which the biggest obstacles to the 
free movement of workers are obstacles that prevent migrants from becoming migrant 
workers in the first place, or from regaining worker status having become 
unemployed. This could be combined with contesting indirect discrimination, wherever 
the measures in question can be framed as restricting access to benefits that facilitate 
access to the labour market. Measures that make it more difficult for own state 
nationals to seek work having worked elsewhere in the EU should be identified and 
challenged. Finally, the Commission has a role to play, both through case work, and 
through awareness-raising activities, in stressing to national legislatures and 
judiciaries the importance of the prohibition of obstacles to movement. This is 
especially important in the light of the new Enforcement Directive; Member States 
need to appreciate and implement the principles contained therein if they are to 
effectively enforce them. 
 
Article 45 TFEU prevents national rules that discriminate directly on grounds of 
nationality, e.g. only Italians can work for the Ministry of Defence. These rules can be 
justified by relying on the Treaty derogations. It is also directed towards measures 
that discriminate indirectly on grounds of nationality, e.g. in order to be employed in a 
school the worker needs to be fluent in Italian. These rules can be justified on 
imperative grounds of public interest provided they are necessary and proportionate. 
Finally, Article 45 precludes obstacles/barriers/restrictions to the worker’s ability or 
desirability to move or access the market, e.g. a worker returning to Italy after having 
worked abroad will not be eligible for certain benefits; or a worker cannot be 
employed by more than one employer, or in more than one Member State. These rules 
can also be justified on imperative grounds of public interest as above. 
 
Although there are numerous studies and doctrinal contributions on the development 
from a discrimination approach toward an obstacle approach and all the consequences 
this has, it should be stressed that most free movement of persons cases could be 
treated using a discrimination approach, albeit ‘discrimination based on migration’ 
rather than pure nationality discrimination. The language of obstacles is in itself 
perhaps a bit misleading, since the cases predominantly deal with obstacles to 
movement rather than mere obstacles to market access experienced after movement. 
The construct of discrimination on grounds of movement might also help with making 
‘obstacle’ arguments more accessible in national courts, by framing them as a familiar, 
hard legal concept (discrimination), and accepting inherent limits hinted at by the 
Bosman case law, that only measures penalising the exercise of free movement rights 
be caught. Discrimination on grounds of migration has the advantage of creating 
clearer boundaries (therefore making it easier to apply law) to the free movement of 
persons, whilst at the same time being less intrusive to national regulatory autonomy. 
 
The classification as ‘discrimination’ or ‘obstacles/restrictions/barriers’ in the case law 
should not be considered excessively rigid. What really matters is whether the rule has 
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an effect on intra-Union migration. If such an effect is found through either 
discrimination or a barrier to movement or an obstacle, then the rule will have to be 
justified. In order to claim indirect discrimination it is sufficient that the rule might 
affect more foreigners or migrants than nationals and no particular evidence is 
required. In order to claim an obstacle it is sufficient to show that the rule might deter 
or discourage the free movement of workers, or that it might constitute a barrier to 
market access. Again no particular evidence is required. For this reason, it is advisable 
to claim both discrimination and obstacle in litigation. 
 
There are nonetheless some manifest differences between the discrimination and the 
obstacle approach. If a finding of discrimination can be supported by statistical data, 
then it will be very difficult for the Member State to defend such discrimination. A 
finding of discrimination is then again politically less problematic. This is so because if 
the CJEU finds discrimination the Member State might amend the rules simply to 
remove that discrimination, whilst if the CJEU finds that the rule is an unjustified 
obstacle to free movement the Member State will have to remove the rule for all 
economic operators. This might be very important should governments seek to 
introduce new restrictions on, for instance, the possibility to claim benefits or social 
advantages. Once discrimination is established the Graf doctrine (effect of rule too 
remote and indirect) cannot be invoked: no matter how minimal the discrimination is, 
it always needs to be justified. On the other hand, the Member State might attempt to 
reverse a claim of discrimination with statistical data (albeit this would not be 
conclusive). There are also inherent limits to the definition of ‘obstacle’, as a rule is 
not to be considered an obstacle if it is inherent in the organisation of the employment 
concerned or if the effect of the rule is too uncertain and indirect to be qualified as a 
barrier to movement. 
 
Finally, it can be observed that the justification of indirect discrimination and obstacles 
runs along similar lines. In several cases the CJEU does not carry out a separate 
assessment of necessity and proportionality, so that it would simply look at whether 
the measure is ‘appropriate’ and necessary to achieve the purported aim. In more 
recent times, the scrutiny as to the necessity of measures has also focused on issues 
such as the coherence of the rule within the legal system. Case law suggests that 
where both are established, indirect discrimination may be more readily justified by a 
Member State than obstacles to movement, where the former typically affect non-
nationals and the latter own nationals.  
 
The more traditional proportionality assessment, on the other hand, focuses very 
much on whether the restriction on the person’s freedom is out of proportion with the 
policy aim pursued. ‘Proportionality proper’ is a very useful tool in the armoury of 
private claimants, especially in those cases where the rule itself might be legitimate 
but the application of the rule to that particular claimant is disproportionate because of 
the hardship it would cause. ‘Proportionality proper’ is less useful in relation to the 
abstract review of legislation (as it is carried out in Commission proceedings) where 
rules can only be declared either compatible or incompatible with Union law without 
there been any possibility for an individual assessment. In those cases, the analysis 
would focus on whether the measure is appropriate and necessary as detailed above.  
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1 Introduction 
 
This report is the result of the analysis of a FreSsco Think Tank group mandated by 
the European Commission to provide clarification on the usage and meaning of the 
crucial free movement of workers’ concepts of direct and indirect discrimination as 
well as obstacles to free movement. 
 
The right to free movement of workers, enshrined in Article 45 TFEU and Regulation 
(EU) No 492/2011, requires inter alia the elimination of any discrimination based on 
nationality (Article 45(2) TFEU, and Articles 2 to 10 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011). 
Article 46(b) refers to abolishing procedures and practices that form an obstacle to the 
exercise of this right (Article 46(b) TFEU). However, neither Article 45 TFEU nor 
Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 contain any definition of discrimination or obstacle, 
although for access to employment Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 in its Article 3(1)(b) 
gives a description of a situation of indirect discrimination. The case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gives some definitional guidance on these 
issues.  
 
Article 45 TFEU clearly covers direct discrimination: this consists of treating like 
situations in a different way, or unlike situations similarly. According to EU law on the 
free movement of workers, nationality in relation to access to employment, working 
conditions including salary, access to tax and social advantages and housing, as well 
as membership of trade unions, is not a difference which justifies a different 
treatment. Direct discrimination is easy to identify (e.g. the publication of a vacancy of 
a private employer which provides that only nationals can apply for the post or that 
non-nationals cannot have access to a social advantage). It can only be justified 
pursuant to a limited number of Treaty derogations. 
 
Indirect discrimination is more difficult and sometimes more complex to identify: it 
occurs when measures are neutral in their formulation (do not expressly discriminate 
on the basis of nationality) but in practice have a disproportionate impact upon a 
protected group. The CJEU defined indirect discrimination very widely in the case 
O'Flynn as any provision of national law “intrinsically liable to affect migrant workers 
more than national workers and if there is a risk that it will place the former at a 
particular disadvantage”. Unlike direct discrimination, indirect discrimination can be 
justified on several grounds, provided the Member State can show a legitimate aim 
and that the measures it has taken are objectively justified and proportionate to the 
aim pursued. 
 
The CJEU also provided a definition of an obstacle to the free movement of workers in 
the famous Bosman case: “Provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member 
State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of 
movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without 
regard to the nationality of the workers concerned”. The CJEU has also held that the 
provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom of movement for persons are intended to 
facilitate the pursuit by Union citizens of occupational activities of all kinds throughout 
the Union, and to preclude measures which might place Union citizens at a 
disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of 
another Member State. However, according to CJEU case law, and similarly to 
instances of indirect discrimination, an obstacle can be justified when the rules 
creating the obstacle pursue a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and are 
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justified by pressing reasons of public interest, are necessary and proportionate (i.e. 
they do not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose).  
 
In the light of the case law of the CJEU, the European Commission has mandated 
FreSsco to: 
 
 analyse and better define the notion of obstacle/restriction and of indirect 
discrimination; 
 make a clear distinction between an obstacle and indirect discrimination; 
 describe whether the CJEU’s requirements for establishing the existence of an 
obstacle are more or less demanding than those for establishing the existence 
of an indirect discrimination; 
 describe whether the qualification of a measure as an obstacle or as an indirect 
discrimination has any consequences as to the examination of that measure's 
compatibility with EU law; 
 illustrate the analysis with examples on the basis of CJEU case law as well as 
on the basis of national experiences. 
 
Following this mandate, the FreSsco Think Tank group has engaged in an overview of 
the legal framework of the free movement of workers and has taken this as a starting 
point to assess the broader analytical framework concerning the implementation and 
enforcement of the right to freedom of movement as a worker.  
 
In this regard, the group has first studied the overall legal framework and the 
(personal/material) scope of Article 45 TFEU. Specific attention was dedicated to the 
conceptual distinction between the discrimination approach and the obstacle approach 
in the CJEU case law. Based on this, the report further explores the particular impact 
of the delineation of the personal and material scope of the free movement of 
workers, but also the problems stemming from this delineation. More concretely, it 
explores how the qualification of the claimant as a worker can influence a case and 
how the classification of a national measure as a discrimination or an obstacle can 
affect the outcome of a case. The main question here is: why is it important to be 
regarded as a worker, and how can you make a strong case against a barrier to 
movement? The report also assesses how similar measures can be classified as 
discrimination, an obstacle, or both, and the consequences for justification. The main 
question here is: which measures can still be justified by the Member States and how? 
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2 The general framework of the free movement of 
workers 
2.1 Objectives and legal framework 
Article 39 EEC (then 48 EC, now 45 TFEU) introduced the fundamental right for all 
citizens of the Member States to freely exercise their profession Community-wide after 
a transitional period (which ended in 1969). 
The free movement of workers is now described in Article 45 TFEU, which provides the 
following: 
“1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union. 
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. 
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health: 
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made; 
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose; 
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the 
provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action; 
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that 
State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by 
the Commission. 
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service.” 
The free movement of workers has been a central element of the European Union ever 
since the very beginning in 1957,1 but was given effect only in 1968 when two acts 
concerning secondary legislation were passed: Regulation (EEC) No 1612/682 on the 
freedom of movement of workers and Directive 68/3603 on the abolition of restrictions 
on movement and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and 
their families, which set the conditions for the effective exercise of free movement for 
workers. 
The term ‘workers of the Member States’ in Article 45(1) TFEU only covers workers 
who are nationals of a Member State. Workers who are nationals of a non-Member 
State, but reside and work permanently in a Member State are not included. In 
accordance thereto, Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 refers expressly to ‘nationals of a 
Member State’. 
                                          
1 The free movement of workers thus forms part of the foundations of the Union, just as do Article 49 TFEU 
providing the right of establishment, Article 56 TFEU stipulating the freedom to provide services and Article 
28 TFEU on the free movement of goods. In terms of economic constitutionalism, these fundamental 
freedoms are, in accordance with Article 26(2) TFEU, components of the internal market. ‘Fundamental 
freedoms’ as a generic term for the free movement of capital, goods, services and persons cannot be found 
in the Treaty, but is used by the CJEU. See case C-203/80, Casati, ECLI:EU:C:1981:261; case C-205/84, 
Commission v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1986:463. 
2 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 on free movement of workers, OJ 1968 L 257/2. 
3 Directive 68/360 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for 
workers of Member States and their families, OJ 1968 L 257/13. 
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The rights of workers under the free movement provisions of the Treaty are not 
unlimited. Limitations are provided for in the Treaty itself, notably on grounds of 
public policy, public security, public health and for employment in the public service 
(Articles 45(3) and (4) TFEU). These limitations have been interpreted narrowly by the 
CJEU in accordance with the fundamental principle that exceptions to fundamental 
rights are to be narrowly construed.4 According to the relevant case law on Article 
45(4) TFEU, for example, posts of railway workers, nurses, teachers, civil researchers 
etc are not covered by this exception, which only applies to employment in public 
service that involves participation in the safeguarding of the State’s general interests.5 
With respect to enlargements of the European Union, transitional provisions allowed 
‘old’ Member States to restrict access to their labour markets for ‘new’ acceding States 
(for up to seven years in specific circumstances6). 
From its earliest judgements in the 1970s, the CJEU confirmed that the right to free 
movement and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality was directly applicable7 
and thus took precedence over conflicting national law. The details of the rights of 
migrant workers have been further developed in several secondary instruments, in 
particular in Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 (formerly Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68) on 
the free movement of workers,8 Citizens’ Rights Directive 2004/389 and Regulations 
(EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 regarding the coordination of social security 
systems. 
Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 further implements the principle of equal treatment for 
migrant workers.10 A key, and possibly the most cited, provision of this instrument is 
Article 7(2), which provides that a migrant worker11 and the members of his or her 
family enjoy “the same social and tax advantages” as a national worker. ‘Social 
advantages’ are all advantages which, whether or not linked to a contract of 
employment, are generally granted to national workers because of their objective 
status as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national 
territory, where the extension of such advantages to EU national migrant workers 
seems likely to facilitate the mobility of such workers within the Union.12 Migrant 
workers are guaranteed certain rights linked to the status of worker even when they 
are no longer in an employment relationship.13 The extension of the concept of ‘social 
advantage’ in the case law of the CJEU, which may include advantages as diverse as 
the right of a person to request that proceedings take place in a language other than 
the language normally used,14 or the right of residence for the unmarried partner of a 
migrant worker,15 has been central to the development of migrant workers’ rights.16 
                                          
4 Case C-30/77, Bouchereau, ECLI:EU:C:1977:172; case C-152/73, Sotgiu, ECLI:EU:C:1974:13; case C-
149/79, Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1980:297; case C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum, ECLI:EU:C:1986:284. 
5 Case C-149/79, Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1980:297. 
6 See e.g. Accession Treaty (2003), Annexes V to XV of 2003, OJ 236/807 et seq. 
7 Case 167/73, Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:1974:35; case C-41/74, van Duyn, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133; 
case C-48/75, Royer, ECLI:EU:C:1976:57. 
8 Previously known as Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68. 
9 Directive 2004/38 replaces former Directive 68/360 on the rights of entry and residence and Directive 
1251/70 on the right to remain.  
10 The rules of equal treatment in respect of social advantages in now Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 apply to 
dependent workers only. However, the self-employed may invoke comparable rights by virtue of Article 49 
TFEU despite the absence of secondary legislation. 
11 The fourth recital of the preamble of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 states that the right of free movement 
must be enjoyed without discrimination by permanent, seasonal and frontier workers as well as by those 
who pursue their activities for the purpose of providing services. 
12 Case C-310/91, Schmid, ECLI:EU:C:1993:221; Case C-57/96, Meints, ECLI:EU:C:1997:564. 
13 Case C-39/86, Lair, ECLI:EU:C:1988:322. 
14 Case C-137/84, Mutsch, ECLI:EU:C:1985:335. 
15 Case C-59/85, Reed, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157. 
16 The interpretation of social advantages has been established in respect of such benefits as railway 
discount cards for large families; case C-32/75, Cristini, ECLI:EU:C:1975:120 (childbirth loans); case C-
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The freedom of movement of workers is therefore more than just an instrument for 
achieving an economic objective, but must be seen as an instrument by which the 
worker is guaranteed the possibility of improving his or her living and working 
conditions and promoting his or her social advancement, although these social 
objectives might be seen as the necessary corollary of promoting free economic 
movement.17 
Article 21 TFEU, which sets out generally the right of every Union citizen to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in 
Article 45 TFEU in relation to freedom of movement for workers. This means that in 
such a case Article 45 TFEU takes precedence over Article 21 TFEU and is solely 
applicable.18 
In its Martínez Sala19 judgement the CJEU first checked if the claimant, who had 
worked in Germany and after losing her job had received social assistance benefits, 
could base her claim to the German child-raising allowance on Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71 or Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68. As her status as an employed person for 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 or of a worker for Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 could 
not be clarified, the CJEU based its decision on Articles 18 and 21 TFEU, as Mrs 
Martínez Sala, as a Spanish national, was a Union citizen lawfully residing in another 
Member State. 
Social protection of persons moving from one country to another is a crucial aspect of 
the freedom of movement, as workers would be reluctant to move to another Member 
State to take up employment if they ran the risk of losing social security rights 
acquired or in the process of being acquired. Furthermore, the rules on equal 
                                                                                                                             
65/81, Reina, ECLI:EU:C:1982:6 (invalidity benefits); case C-63/76, Inzirillo, ECLI:EU:C:1976:192, and 
case C-310/91, Schmid, ECLI:EU:C:1993:221 (minimum means or subsistence); case C-261/83, Castelli, 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:280; case C-249/83, Hoeckx, ECLI:EU:C:1985:139; case C-122/84, Scrivner, 
ECLI:EU:C:1985:145; case C-139/85, Kempf, ECLI:EU:C:1986:223 (financial support for students); case C-
235/87, Matteucci, ECLI:EU:C:1988:460; case C-308/89, di Leo, ECLI:EU:C:1990:400; case C-3/90, 
Bernini, ECLI:EU:C:1992:89 (maternity benefits); case C-111/91, Commission of the European 
Communities v Grand-Dutchy of Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:1993:92 (family benefits); case C-185/96, 
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1998:516 (guaranteed social 
minimum for elderly persons); case C-157/84, Frascogna, ECLI:EU:C:1985:243; case C-261/83, Castelli, 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:280. From this case law it appears that the principal function of Regulations (EEC) No 
1612/68 and now (EU) No 492/2011 is to provide for a general prohibition of non-discrimination with 
respect to benefits which do not qualify as ‘social security’ in the sense of the social security Coordination 
Regulations. Furthermore, the material scope of legal arrangements covered by the Regulation on free 
movement of workers is not restricted to legislation as in Article 1(l) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
17 This case law presaged the creation of citizenship of the Union by the Maastricht Treaty. This concept of 
Union citizenship marks a process of emancipation of Union rights from the economic paradigm insofar as 
they are no longer bestowed upon citizens solely when they make use of the economic freedoms and 
assume a corresponding status as a worker or provider of services, but directly by virtue of their legal status 
as a citizen of the Union. Union citizenship attributes central significance to the right to move and to reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States (Article 21 TFEU), since this is the precondition for 
exercising most fundamental freedoms and basic rights. Union citizenship aims therefore at a general 
freedom of movement, independent from economic freedoms. With the introduction of Union citizenship the 
link between economic activity and entitlement to social benefits has been severed, as Article 18 EC (now 
21 TFEU) has opened new possibilities for persons who were previously excluded from the personal scope of 
Community law because they neither engaged in work nor provided or received services by attributing 
central significance to the right to move and to reside freely within the territory of Member States as the 
precondition for exercising most fundamental freedoms and basic rights. Union citizenship thus aims at a 
general freedom of movement, independent from economic activities. The fact that Union citizenship confers 
the right of free movement on every citizen of the EU Member States is reflected by the fact that there is 
now one simple legal instrument – Directive 2004/38 – dealing with the right to move and reside freely 
within the European Union. At the same time a paradigm shift has to be detected from a selective, 
category-based model of market solidarity to the recognition, to a certain degree, i.e. limited recognition of 
a transnational personal status of all citizens of the Union which establishes a general claim of social 
integration in the host Member State.  
18 Case C-287/05, Hendrix, ECLI:EU:C:2007:196. 
19 Case 85/96, Martínez Sala, ECLI:EU:C:1998:217. 
 
 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
The notions of obstacle and discrimination under EU law 
on free movement of workers 
 
December 2014   12 
treatment and access to social security are instrumental to facilitating social 
integration into the host State. The fundamental principle underlying the social 
security coordination system envisaged by Article 48 TFEU and implemented by 
Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 is the equality of treatment 
between nationals and EU non-nationals.20 The Regulations also guarantee the 
aggregation of periods, the assimilation of facts and the exportation of benefits, to 
minimise the disadvantages incurred when migrating. 
Thus, the rights of workers and their family members to enter a Member State, to 
take up residence therein, and to engage in economic activity on the same basis as 
nationals of that Member State are set out in detail in secondary legislation. However, 
such law reflects only partially the CJEU case law on the impact of the Treaty 
provisions on free movement, the CJEU often basing its decisions not on the 
respective Regulations, but directly on the Treaty provisions.21 Accordingly, the fact 
that secondary legislation does not provide for solutions to certain problems faced by 
persons when moving from one Member State to another does not necessarily mean 
that these persons are without any protection under European law, since the free 
movement of workers provisions can be invoked directly. 
National law must comply with the requirements of both primary law and secondary 
legislation. These are two independent yardsticks which must be applied concurrently, 
and the CJEU has accordingly held that the compatibility of a provision of national law 
with secondary EU law does not render the examination of primary law unnecessary.22 
The interpretation of the Treaty free movement provisions is of paramount 
constitutional importance, since the broader the interpretation, the greater the 
potential intrusion in the Member States’ regulatory autonomy. Because of the broad 
definition of the concept of worker and the fact that almost every field of national 
policy can come within the radius of action of EU free movement law,23 the question of 
which types of measure, requirement or conduct fall within the scope of the Treaty 
(and therefore within the jurisdiction of the CJEU) becomes all the more important. 
The recently enacted Directive 2014/54/EU on measures facilitating the exercise of 
rights conferred to workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers (the 
‘Enforcement Directive’),24 which must be implemented by 21 May 2016 is aimed, 
amongst others, at providing and ensuring the provision of independent legal and 
other assistance to Union workers, conducting independent surveys, publishing 
independent reports and information on application at national level of the EU rules on 
the free movement of workers. The Member States are to designate national 
structures or special bodies intended to promote equal treatment and non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality as well as to remove unjustified restrictions on 
or obstacles to the right of free movement. These bodies should act as ‘contact points’ 
vis-à-vis equivalent bodies in other Member States and cooperate with existing 
information and assistant services and other entities. Information about rights 
conferred by the Directive that is independent, up-to-date, comprehensive, accessible, 
                                          
20 EU migrant workers must be subject to the same conditions of affiliation to social security schemes as 
national workers (case C-33/88, Allué and Coonan, ECLI:EU:C:1989:222) and must be entitled to receive 
the same range and level of benefits which may entail the ‘export’ of benefits to another Member State. The 
result should be parity, in social security terms, between nationals and EU non-nationals subject to the 
same social security system insofar as both contribute to the system and receive benefits on the same 
terms. 
21 Case C-379/11, Caves Krier, ECLI:EU:C:2012:798; case C-233/12, Gardella, ECLI:EU:C:2013:449. 
22 Case C-158/96, Kohll, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171. 
23 See e.g. the broad interpretation of social advantages in case C-207/78, Even, ECLI:EU:C:1979:144, and 
the overall tendency of free movement law to tackle almost any issue as long as there is some connection 
with freedom of movement of the Union citizen. See case C-60/00, Carpenter, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434; case 
C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, ECLI:EU:C:2006:676; Case C-499/06, Nerkowska, ECLI:EU:C:2008:300. 
24 OJ of 30 April 2014. 
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free of charge and in more than one EU official language should be provided. 
Associations and organisations with a legitimate interest, e.g. the social partners, 
must be given entitlement to enforce rights on behalf of Union workers. Providing 
migrant workers with adequate and accurate information is not only of crucial 
importance to ensure access to the labour market and social protection in the host 
Member State, but is also apt to facilitate the work of the institutions concerned. 
2.2 Definition of key concepts 
Before entering into a deeper analysis, it is necessary to clarify the exact meaning of 
the key concepts in the framework of the free movement of workers, as defined by the 
CJEU.  
‘Worker’ in the context of the free movement of workers of Article 45 TFEU is defined 
in the Lawrie-Blum25 case as a person performing services for and under the direction 
of another person in return for which she or he receives remuneration. 
It is commonly known that discrimination occurs when the same situations are treated 
differently or when different situations are treated the same; such treatment is 
unlawful unless objectively justified.26 Unlawful discrimination occurs when criteria 
which are not relevant, like nationality, are relied upon as grounds for different 
treatment. It will always be necessary, therefore, to ascertain first which criteria are 
relevant to the choice of treatment and which are not.27 The prohibition of 
discrimination based on nationality encompasses both direct and indirect 
discrimination.28  
Direct discrimination occurs when national rules expressly distinguish on grounds of 
nationality. It entails that nationals and non-nationals are treated differently in law.  
Indirect discrimination is broadly construed in the CJEU case law.29 It occurs when 
rules, although neutral in their formulation, are likely to bear more heavily on a 
protected group. The CJEU gave the most comprehensive definition of indirect 
discrimination in the O’Flynn case. It held that “conditions imposed by national law 
must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory where, although applicable irrespective 
of nationality, they affect essentially migrant workers […] or the great majority of 
those affected are migrant workers […], where they are indistinctly applicable but can 
more easily be satisfied by national workers than by migrant workers […] or where 
there is a risk that they may operate to the particular detriment of migrant workers”30. 
                                          
25 Case C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum, ECLI:EU:C:1986:284. 
26 Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04, ABNA and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2005:741, 
paragraph 63, and case C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, ECLI:EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 95; case C-300/04, 
Eman and Sevinger, ECLI:EU:C:2006:545, paragraph 57. In case C-43/95, Data-Delecta, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:357, the Court said that the principle of non-discrimination requires “perfect equality of 
treatment in Member States of persons in a situation governed by EU law and nationals of the Member 
States in question”. See also case C-122/96, Saldanha, ECLI:EU:C:1997:458; case C-411/98, Ferlini, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:530. 
27 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, delivered on 30 November 2006 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62004CC0227%2801%29&rid=2#Footnote1), case C-227/04, P Maria-
Luise Lindorfer v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2007:490. 
28 In legal doctrine, one also finds the distinction between formal and substantive discrimination. Formal 
discrimination is when a rule explicitly divides by an illegitimate factor. Substantive discrimination is 
determined largely by effect and may be direct or indirect. Davies, 15. 
29 First case: case C-15/69, Ugliola, ECLI:EU:C:1969:46; case C-152/73, Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:13. Other cases: case C-111/91, Commission v Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:1993:92, 
paragraph 9; case C-419/92, Scholz v Opera Universitaria di Cagliari and Cinzia Porcedda, 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:62, paragraph 7; case C-278/94, Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1996:321, paragraph 
27. 
30 Case C-237/94, O’Flynn, ECLI:EU:C:1996:206; see also case C-152/73, Sotgiu, ECLI:EU:C:1974:13. 
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To detect indirect discrimination, neither the form nor the intention matter, but the 
effect of the rule is relevant for the assessment. Typical ‘neutral’ but often indirectly 
discriminatory conditions are residence conditions,31 conditions regarding professional 
qualification32 or language requirements.33 
The concept of obstacles to free movement, also known as restrictions, impediments 
or barriers,34 was introduced in the free movement of workers case law in the mid-
1990s. In the Bosman case, the CJEU held that “provisions which preclude or deter a 
national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his 
freedom of movement constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply 
without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned”35 and that, although the 
rules indistinctly applied to national and cross-border situations, “they still directly 
affect […] access to the employment market in other Member States and are thus 
capable of impeding freedom of movement for workers”36. The distinction between 
direct discrimination, indirect discrimination and obstacles to free movement is 
connected to the potential justification of the rule. 
Justification prevents a rule that on the face of it is discriminatory or an obstacle to 
free movement from breaching EU law. Direct discrimination can only be justified 
based on one of the grounds expressly provided for in the Treaty: public policy, public 
security and public health (Article 45(3) and (4)). Indirect discrimination and obstacles 
to free movement can be justified pursuant to the Treaty derogations, but also by 
relying on other public policy grounds, the imperative requirements of public 
interest.37 In order to be compatible with EU law an indirectly discriminatory or 
restrictive national measure must pursue an aim compatible with EU law and the 
restriction imposed must be necessary to achieve that aim, as well as proportionate. 
                                          
31 Case C-350/96, Clean car, ECLI:EU:C:1998:205; case C-388/01, Commission v Italy, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:30; case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda v Commissariaat voor 
de Media, ECLI:EU:C:1991:323. In direct taxation cases, the assessment of indirect discrimination is rather 
different as tax systems are inherently territorial and therefore different treatment between nationals and 
non-nationals can more easily be explained as they are not in a comparable situation. However, this does 
not exclude that tax law is considered to be indirectly discriminatory. See case C-87/99, Zurstrassen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:251. 
32 Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, ECLI:EU:C:1991:193; case C-11/77, Patrick v 
Ministre des affaires culturelles, ECLI:EU:C:1977:113; case C-71/76, Thieffry v Conseil de l'ordre des 
avocats de la Cour de Paris, ECLI:EU:C:1977:65. See also Directive 2005/36 on the recognition of 
professional qualification in this regard. 
33 Case C-379/87, Groener v Minister for Education and City of Dublin Vocational Education Committee, 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:599. However, in case C-424/97, Haim I, ECLI:EU:C:2000:357, a language requirement 
was treated as an obstacle rather than as an indirectly discriminating measure. 
34 The CJEU has ruled in many decisions that free movement may not be “prohibited”, “obstructed”, 
“hindered”, “hampered”, “discouraged”, “placed at a disadvantage”, “deterred” or “made less attractive” – 
English terms which are often used cumulatively. It is an open question if and when the terms used indicate 
sometimes different degrees of restrictive effects. In any case, the terms used in the other languages, in 
particular in the language of the case and the working language of the CJEU, i.e. French, would have to be 
taken into consideration as well. 
35 Case C-352/06, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:2008:290, paragraph 96. 
36 Case C-352/06, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:2008:290, paragraph 103. 
Since its Dassonville judgement (case C-8/74; ECLI:EU:C:1974:82) the CJEU has interpreted national trade 
rules which “are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade”. 
The same applies to the freedom to provide services, to the freedom of establishment and also to the free 
movement of workers (case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463). The so-called Dassonville formula 
does not only limit the scope of application to particular forms or means of hindrances, i.e. does not only 
protect against discrimination, but also against all other forms of constraints. However, a restriction which 
falls within the scope of a fundamental freedom does not automatically represent a violation of this freedom 
as it may be permissible under certain conditions, i.e. may be justified. 
37 It should however be noted that the case law is not always consistent in that regard. 
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The CJEU explained the rule of reason as a common test38 for all fundamental 
freedoms in the Gebhard39 case:  
“It follows, however, from the Court's case law that national measures liable to hinder 
or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty must fulfil four conditions:  
- they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner;  
- they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest;  
- they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they 
pursue;  
- and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.” 
Next to this, the measure must, where appropriate, also respect fundamental rights as 
general principles of Union law. 
2.3 The scope of application 
2.3.1 The personal scope 
2.3.1.1 The definition of worker 
Workers have the greatest package of equal treatment rights, but the term ‘worker’ 
was not defined in European legislation, other than to make clear that the term does 
not include persons who are nationals of third countries residing and working in a 
Member State but covers only Member State nationals. The worker concept has been 
defined by the CJEU in the light of principles derived from the European legal order, 
and to prevent it from being determined by the national legislations of the Member 
States as otherwise the Member States would be able to unilaterally alter the scope of 
the Treaty provisions.  
The EU concept of ‘worker’ has three basic elements, namely the provision of labour, 
remuneration and subordination: “The essential feature of an employment relationship 
is that a person performs services of some economic value for and under the 
direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.”40 
Someone who is genuinely seeking employment can also be classified as a worker. 
However, and as we will see in more detail below, the residence and equal treatment 
rights of jobseekers are limited and conditional.  
The CJEU has interpreted the notion of worker broadly, highlighting that it defines the 
scope of one of the fundamental freedoms granted by the Treaty. Accordingly, the 
notion of ‘worker’ must not be interpreted restrictively,41 and includes permanent, 
part-time,42 seasonal and frontier workers. Workers might earn below the minimum 
required for subsistence and have full access to welfare and tax benefits.43  
                                          
38 A common approach applying to all free movement of persons provisions was already propagated in case 
C-48/75, Royer, ECLI:EU:C:1976:57. 
39 Case C-55/94, Gebhard, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, paragraph 37, referring to case C-19/92, Kraus, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:125, paragraph 32. 
40 Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum, ECLI:EU:C:1986:284. 
41 Case 53/81, Levin, ECLI:EU:C:1982:105; joined cases C-389/87 and C-390/87, Echternach, 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:130. 
42 Furthermore, since in most industries women form most of the part-time workforce, to exclude part-
timers from the scope of Article 45 TFEU would have had sex discrimination implications.  
43 Case C-139/85, Kempf, ECLI:EU:C:1986:223. 
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In order to qualify as an EU migrant worker, the key is that work is ‘genuine and 
effective’ as distinct from ‘ancillary and marginal’. Work can still be genuine and 
effective when productivity is low, activities are performed for a small number of hours 
per week and remuneration is limited.44 This loose formula has remained unchanged 
for decades, with the CJEU repeatedly holding that the notion of worker should be 
interpreted broadly.45 The CJEU has never accepted a de minimis rule regarding 
remuneration and working time, instead favouring a case-by-case approach.  
The fact that a worker has worked only for a short period of time under a fixed-term 
contract does not exclude him or her from the scope of Article 45 TFEU, provided that 
the activity was not purely marginal and ancillary. In Ninni-Orasche,46 the claimant 
had worked for just two and a half months. The CJEU instructed the national court to 
have sole regard to the nature of the activity, i.e. whether it was genuine and not 
purely ancillary, in order to determine the status of Ms Ninni-Orasche, and to 
disregard any other consideration, including the facts that she had taken up the job 
years after having first entered the host territory; that soon after taking up the job 
she obtained a qualification which made her eligible for enrolment in a university; and 
the fact that she was looking for a job in between finishing her short fixed-term 
employment and enrolling at university.47 The reason why an individual moves to seek 
work in another Member State is immaterial to her or his qualification as a worker. 
Thus, it is irrelevant that a person has moved for the sole purpose of triggering the 
Treaty and therefore benefit of rights granted by EU law, provided that he or she 
pursues or wishes to pursue an effective and genuine activity.48  
The personal scope of the free movement of workers also extends to contractual 
counterparties with the result that an employer can rely on the Treaty free movement 
of workers provisions to challenge rules that limit the freedom of his or her 
employees.49 Posted workers, in contrast to migrant workers, do not enter the labour 
market of the host Member State, but work in that State on a temporary basis, within 
the context of the provision of services of their employer, and they remain part of the 
labour force of their home State.50 Accordingly, the standards concerning the free 
movement of workers are not applicable, whereas those concerning the free 
movement of services are.51 
2.3.1.2 Retention of the worker status 
First, workers might retain their status as workers if they are temporarily unable to 
work as a result of an accident or illness. Second, they also retain this status if they 
are involuntarily unemployed, provided that they have worked for at least a year in 
the host State and they have registered as a jobseeker. Furthermore, if this second 
group has worked for less than a year the status of worker is also retained for at least 
six months. Finally, the status is retained if they enrol in vocational training related to 
                                          
44 Case C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum, ECLI:EU:C:1986:284, paragraphs 19-21; case C-344/87, Bettray, 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:226, paragraph 15; case C-3/90, Bernini, ECLI:EU:C:1990:164, paragraphs 15 and 16. 
45 Case C-444/93, Megner and Scheffel, ECLI:EU:C:1995:442. 
46 Case C-413/01, Ninni-Orasche, ECLI:EU:C:2003:600, paragraph 32. 
47 See also case C-46/12, L.N. v Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og Uddannelsesstøtte, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:97. 
48 Case C-53/81, Levin, ECLI:EU:C:1982:105; case C-109/01, Akrich, ECLI:EU:C:2003:491; see also case 
C-46/12, L.N. v Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og Uddannelsesstøtte, ECLI:EU:C:2013:97. 
49 Case C-350/96, Clean car, ECLI:EU:C:1998:205; case C-379/11, Caves Krier, ECLI:EU:C:2012:798. 
50 As far as employment and working conditions are concerned, Directive 96/71 envisages laying down a 
nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection to be observed in the host countries by employers who 
post workers to perform temporary work in the territory of a Member State where the services are provided. 
51 Joined cases C-49/98, Finalarte and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2001:564; case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa, 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:142; case C-43/93, Vander Elst, ECLI:EU:C:1994:310. 
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their employment, unless the worker is involuntarily unemployed, in which case the 
vocational training can be in any area.52  
2.3.1.3 Genuine and effective activity 
Even though the concept of worker is generously construed, it still covers only the 
pursuit of effective and genuine activities, and not activities on such a small scale as 
to be regarded as ‘marginal and ancillary’.53 In Bettray the CJEU held that work cannot 
be regarded as an effective and genuine economic activity if it merely constitutes a 
means of rehabilitation or reintegration for the persons concerned and if the purpose 
of the paid employment, which is adapted to the physical and mental capabilities of 
each person, is to enable those persons sooner or later to recover their capacity to 
take ordinary employment or to lead as normal as possible a life.54 In the Trojani 
case,55 a French citizen living in Belgium worked about 30 hours a week for the 
Salvation Army as part of a personal socio-occupational reintegration scheme. In 
return for his work he received board, lodging and some pocket money. When he 
claimed subsistence benefits, these were denied on the grounds that he was not a 
worker within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU and was therefore not entitled to social 
assistance. The CJEU held that in deciding whether work is to be regarded as an 
‘effective and genuine’ economic activity the national court: 
“must in particular ascertain whether the services actually performed by Mr Trojani are 
capable of being regarded as forming part of the normal labour market. For that 
purpose, account may be taken of the status and practices of the hostel, the content 
of the social reintegration programme, and the nature and details of performance of 
the services”.56 
2.3.1.4 Jobseekers 
Those looking for a job are also protected by Article 45 TFEU (and by Directive 
2004/38). In the first three months, like any other category of citizens, they can enter 
any Member State without limitations. After that, the Member State might require 
them to show that they have a genuine chance of finding employment.57 However, the 
full implications of this are unclear, so we cannot say when,58 and to what extent,59 
Member States might test for such a chance. It is doubtful that the new test 
introduced by the UK according to which, after three months,60 jobseekers have to 
                                          
52 Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38. 
53 Case C-53/81, Levin, ECLI:EU:C:1982:105; case C-413/01, Ninni-Orasche, ECLI:EU:C:2003:600. 
54 Case C-344/87, Bettray, ECLI:EU:C:1989:226. 
55 Case C-456/02, Trojani, ECLI:EU:C:2004:488.  
56 Paragraph 24. 
57 Article 14(4)b of Directive 2004/38. 
58 Antonissen suggests that Member States may impose evidential requirements after six months of 
(unsuccessful) jobseeking, though the Directive seems to permit such requirements earlier. In case C-
344/95, Commission v Belgium, paragraph 17, the legislation under scrutiny allowed jobseekers to be in 
Belgium for three months and then face automatic expulsion. The latter requirement was deemed 
incompatible with EC law, and it is in this context that the CJEU provided for the possibility for the jobseeker 
to demonstrate that she had 'genuine' chance of finding employment. The three months time limit was not 
explicitly addressed by the CJEU. 
59 Given the paramount importance of the free movement of workers (which includes those looking for a 
job) for the EU, restrictions upon an EU citizen's ability to look for a job must be interpreted in a restrictive 
way. 
60 The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No 3) Regulations 2014, (SI 2014 No 2761) in 
combination with the Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2013 (SI 
2013 No 3032) and the Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014 
No 1451). 
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provide 'compelling evidence' of their chance to find a job – or lose their right to 
reside – is compatible with the provisions of Directive 2004/38.61  
 
 Jobseekers have the right to equal treatment, at least in relation to access to 
employment and benefits that support access to the employment market.62 They do 
not have a general right to social assistance (Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38). 
However, the line between general social assistance and those benefits which are 
necessary to exercise a right to reside in a host State in order to seek work can be 
difficult to draw. The extent to which jobseekers are protected in EU law, and the 
extent to which Member States are actually willing to accept jobseekers, is becoming 
more contentious, so it is to be expected that this will be one area where effective 
implementation of EU law will need more careful scrutiny. 
2.3.1.5 Family members 
The worker has the right to be accompanied by his or her family. For the purposes of 
Union law protected family members are the spouse; the registered partner when 
registered partnerships are recognised in the host State; and children under the age of 
21 or children who are dependent upon the worker/spouse,63 as well as dependent 
relatives in the ascending line.64 They have a right to enter and install themselves with 
the worker, as well as a right to take up an economic activity and a right not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of nationality in respect of all matters, including 
welfare benefits.65  
2.3.1.6 Summary 
 
Article 45 TFEU applies to migrant workers (subordinate and remunerated activity). 
This includes: 
 Full-time workers (subordinate and remunerated relationship). 
 Part-time workers, no matter how many hours worked provided the activity is 
not marginal and ancillary. 
 Frontier workers. 
 Seasonal workers. 
 Working students. 
 Jobseekers. Although the latter are protected by Article 45 TFEU, Article 24(2) 
of Directive 2004/38 excludes them from equal treatment in relation to social 
                                          
61 This is especially so as the nature of 'compelling evidence' is very narrowly construed, and speaks to a 
strong likelihood, or even certainty, of imminent employment rather than a 'genuine chance' of it – see 
Department of Work and Pensions MEMO DMG 15/14. 
62 Joined cases C-22/08 and C-23/03, Vatsouras and Koupatantze, ECLI:EU:C:2009:344. 
63 The status of dependency is a result of a factual situation, namely the provision of support by the worker, 
without there being any need to determine the reasons for recourse to such support, see case 316/85 Lebon 
[1987] ECR 2811. 
64 Article 3 of Directive 2004/38 further provides that the Member State must facilitate admission of, and 
justify any denial of entry for, other members of the family who are dependent on the worker or, even 
though not dependent, require for serious health grounds the personal care of the worker (Union citizen); or 
who were living under his or her roof in the country whence he or she came; or the partner with whom the 
Union citizen has a stable and duly attested relationship 
65 Case C-32/75 Cristini v SNCF, ECLI:EU:C:1975:120, p. 1095; case C-63/76, Inzirillo, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:192; case C-261/83, Castelli, ECLI:EU:C:1984:280; case C-157/84, Frascogna, 
ECLI:EU:C:1985:243. In this respect see also Article 24 Directive 2004/38, which extends the equal 
treatment right to family members of Union citizen, provided they have the right of residence or of 
permanent residence.  
Case C-3/90, Bernini, ECLI:EU:C:1992:89, paragraphs 25 and 26. 
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assistance. This has been interpreted narrowly so that jobseekers can access 
benefits intended to facilitate access to the labour market. 
 Article 45 TFEU does not apply to non-remunerated work, including voluntary 
work; and care work within the family unit. It is open to debate whether it 
should apply to internships and other forms of non-remunerated work which 
are aimed at facilitating access to the paid labour market. See below, section 
2.3.1, on issues arising from the definition of worker and the choice of migrant 
worker categories in which to pursue a challenge. 
 Migration exists whenever the worker has moved ‘cross-border’: this includes 
migration to another Member State to work there; returning to the home State 
after having worked abroad; and living in one Member State and working in a 
different one. 
 Article 45 TFEU can be invoked by employers to challenge restrictions on the 
possibility to hire workers. 
 The family of the worker is also protected in EU law. 
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A worker will fall within the scope of Article 45 TFEU if he or she has migrated to 
another Member State in order to look for a job or in order to take up employment; if 
he or she is returning to his or her own Member State after having exercised his or her 
free movement rights (i.e. having been abroad for work); or when he or she is 
residing in one Member State and working in another one (frontier workers). 
2.3.2.2 Direct discrimination 
Direct discrimination on grounds of nationality occurs when a Member State (or an 
employer) distinguishes in law (or explicitly) on grounds of nationality: e.g. only 
Italians can be employed by the Italian civil service. Early case law focused on directly 
discriminating rules and requirements which expressly discriminate on grounds of 
nationality. 
 
Examples  
 
Case C-44/72, Marsman,66 concerned a Dutch national living in the Netherlands but 
employed in Germany, who was dismissed after becoming incapacitated. German 
legislation provided that seriously disabled workers could not be dismissed. However, 
this protection was only available for German nationals. This clear direct discrimination 
on grounds of nationality was evidently contrary to EU law.  
Case C-225/85, Commission v Italian Republic,67 concerned Italian legislation 
providing that private security work could only be carried out by Italian companies 
employing Italian nationals.  
Case C-167/73, Commission v French Republic,68 concerned a provision of the French 
Maritime Code requiring a certain proportion of the crew of a ship to be of French 
nationality. Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 492/11 states that national provisions 
that restrict, by number or percentage, the employment of foreign nationals in any 
undertaking do not apply to nationals of other Member States. Article 4(2) provides 
that if there is a requirement that an undertaking is subject to a minimum percentage 
of national workers being employed, nationals of the other Member States are counted 
as national workers. 
Only rules which expressly distinguish on grounds of nationality are considered directly 
discriminatory. Such rules can only be justified by invoking one of the Treaty 
derogations of public policy, public security, public health; or the public service 
exception. These derogations have been construed narrowly: the CJEU has not allowed 
Member States to invoke such exceptions in relation to all jobs in the public sector or 
in the civil service,69 but only for jobs which require the exercise of public law powers 
and a special allegiance to the Member State.70 Cases involving direct discrimination 
on grounds of nationality are becoming less and less common, but do continue to arise 
every now and then.71 
                                          
66 Case C-44/72, Marsman, ECLI:EU:C:1972:120. 
67 Case C-225/85, Commission v Italian Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1987:284. 
68 Case C-167/73, Commission v French Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1974:35. 
69 Case C-225/85, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1987:284. 
70 Case C-173/94, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1996:264. 
71 In the field of sports, nationality restrictions have been a vexed issue for quite some time; see e.g. case 
C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others v Bosman, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, or case C-265/03, Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:213. 
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2.3.2.3 Indirect discrimination 
Indirect discrimination occurs when an apparently neutral rule affects non-nationals 
more heavily than nationals, e.g. a residence requirement is indirectly discriminatory 
since nationals are more likely to be resident in the national territory than non-
nationals.72  
Discrimination can occur as a result of the operation of any rule; the application of a 
different contract to a certain category of people might in itself be problematic. For 
instance, in Delay,73 exchange assistants (who were more likely to be non-nationals) 
were treated differently from foreign language assistants. As a result, the applicant 
had not benefited from the recognition of rights accrued in earlier employment, which 
detrimentally affected her pay. The CJEU directed the national court to examine 
whether the situations were comparable – given that the rules invoked regarding 
nationals required ‘continuity’ of an employment relationship, and the applicant’s 
employment had been interrupted for two months.  
In the Hartmann case, the Austrian spouse of a German national working in Germany 
who resided in Austria was excluded from receiving German child-raising allowance, 
because she was neither permanently nor ordinarily resident in Germany. According to 
the CJEU such a provision must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is 
intrinsically liable to affect migrant workers more than national workers and if there is 
a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage.74  
In other words, as soon as a requirement is shown to be liable to disadvantage 
migrating workers, it is considered indirect discrimination unless justified – there is no 
need for evidence that the detrimental effect has been realised in practice. Potential 
harm to migrating workers is enough. Several requirements might be considered 
indirectly discriminatory, such as residence, place-of-origin or place-of-education 
requirements that can be more easily satisfied by nationals.  
 
Examples 
 
In case C-152/73, Sotgiu,75 the German Post Office paid an increased separation 
allowance to workers who were employed away from their place of residence in 
Germany, but did not do so for workers with a place of residence outside of Germany, 
regardless of their nationality.  
In case C-138/02, Collins,76 the fact that British law made the entitlement to a 
jobseeker’s allowance conditional upon habitual residency in the UK was considered to 
be indirectly discriminatory.  
In case C-149/79, Commission v Belgium,77 the CJEU held that a system of retirement 
pension points that could more easily be satisfied by Belgian nationals than by migrant 
workers was indirectly discriminatory. 
Language requirements for certain posts are also potentially discriminatory as they are 
much more likely to be satisfied by nationals. However, the nature of the post to be 
                                          
72 See generally case C-237/94, O’Flynn, ECLI:EU:C:1996:206. See also case C-246/80, Broekmeulen, 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:218.. 
73 Case C-276/07, Delay, ECLI:EU:C:2008:282; see also case C-94/07, Raccanelli, ECLI:EU:C:2008:425 
(see below in section 2.3.1.). 
74 Case C-212/05, Hartmann, ECLI:EU:C:2007:437. 
75 Case C-152/73, Sotgiu, ECLI:EU:C:1974:13. 
76 Case C-138/02, Collins, ECLI:EU:C:2004:172. 
77 Case C-149/79, Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1982:195. 
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filled might satisfy the imposition of such conditions. Such requirements were 
considered extensively by the CJEU in the Groener Case, concerning a Dutch national 
working as a part-time art teacher in Ireland, who was rejected for the full-time art 
teaching post after having failed an oral exam in Gaelic.78 The CJEU concluded that, 
although the teaching would most likely take place exclusively in English, the 
government’s language requirement could be justified by the government’s policy to 
promote the use of the Irish language. In any case, the requirement could not be 
imposed in a disproportionate way.  
Language requirements cannot specify that the language must have been learned, or 
qualifications acquired, in a specific territory. The CJEU clarified this in Angonese, 
which concerned an Italian national living in the Bolzano province whose first language 
was German and who was not permitted to compete for a post with a private banking 
undertaking because he did not present the required certificate of bilingualism, only 
issued by the public authorities of Bolzano.79 Overall, the CJEU’s broad interpretation 
of indirectly discriminatory measures, with its focus on the measures’ potential effect 
on workers’ free movement, has significantly increased the number of national rules 
liable to be caught by the Treaty. 
2.3.2.4 Obstacles 
Article 45 TFEU as construed by the CJEU also prohibits unjustified barriers to 
movement and barriers to market access. In Kraus80 the CJEU was faced with a 
German national who went to the United Kingdom, where he took an LLM course at 
Edinburgh University. After returning to Germany, he objected to a German legal 
requirement for authorisation from the competent authority in order to be able to use 
his Scottish academic title. The CJEU noted that the possession of such a title 
constituted, for the person entitled to make use of it, an advantage for the purpose 
both of gaining entry to such a profession and of prospering in it.81 The CJEU held the 
following (paragraph 35): 
“Consequently, Articles 48 and 52 preclude any national measure governing the 
conditions under which an academic title obtained in another Member State may be 
used, where that measure, even though it is applicable without discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, is liable to hamper or to render less attractive the exercise by 
Community nationals, including those of the Member State which enacted the 
measure, of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. The situation would be 
different only if such a measure pursued a legitimate objective compatible with the 
Treaty and was justified by pressing reasons of public interest (…). It would however 
also be necessary in such a case for application of the national rules in question to be 
appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective they pursue and not to go beyond 
what is necessary for that purpose (…).” 
As the claimant had been a migrant student, rather than a migrant worker, the case 
shows that the temporal relationship between an obstacle to free movement and 
economic activity is fairly fluid. In the context of discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, the protection afforded to migrant workers is significantly greater than 
that afforded to those exercising other free movement rights.82 Obstacles on the other 
hand may be challenged by those exercising other Treaty rights of free movement, as 
in Kraus, on the grounds that those obstacles might, on returning to the home State, 
interfere with their re-integration into the home State’s labour market. So post-
                                          
78 Case C-379/87, Groener v Minister for Education, ECLI:EU:C:1989:599. 
79 Case C-281/98, Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296. 
80 Case C-19/92, Kraus, ECLI:EU:C:1993:125. 
81 Ibid, paragraph 18. 
82 Case C-158/07, Förster, ECLI:EU:C:2008:630. 
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migration economic activity is enough to trigger protection from obstacles to 
movement. Obstacles may also be challenged by those who move their Member State 
of residence, without actually moving their State of work, i.e. who continue to work in 
their home State.83  
A few years later the CJEU had the chance to further clarify its case law in the Bosman 
case.84 Here, the CJEU considered whether rules laid down by sporting associations 
were in accordance with Article 45 TFEU. These rules stipulated that a professional 
footballer who is a national of one Member State could not, on the expiry of his 
contract with a club, be employed by another club unless the latter club had paid to 
the former a transfer, training or development fee. The rules applied to all transfers 
regardless of whether the footballer moved clubs within the same Member State or 
between different Member States. The CJEU held (paragraph 95) that: “Provisions 
which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of 
origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an 
obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the 
workers concerned”. 
The CJEU’s reasoning was straightforward. It noted that nationals of Member States 
have in particular the right, which they derived directly from the Treaty, to leave their 
country of origin to enter the territory of another Member State and reside there in 
order to pursue an economic activity.85 It added that provisions which preclude or 
deter a national of a Member State from leaving her or his country of origin in order to 
exercise her or his freedom of movement constitute an obstacle to that freedom even 
if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned.86 This was 
the effect of the rules at issue in the national proceedings in the cases in point, even if 
similar rules also governed transfers between clubs within a single Member State. The 
CJEU then stated: 
“It is sufficient to note that, although the rules in issue in the main proceedings apply 
also to transfers between clubs belonging to different national associations within the 
same Member State and are similar to those governing transfers between clubs 
belonging to the same national association, they still directly affect players’ access to 
the employment market in other Member States and are thus capable of impeding 
freedom of movement for workers.”87  
The CJEU concluded that the transfer rules constituted an obstacle to freedom of 
movement for workers prohibited in principle by Article 45 TFEU. This was so because 
of the transfer fee “hindering access to the market” for Mr Bosman.88 Indeed, the 
requirement of paying a transfer fee blocked Mr Bosman from being able to obtain 
employment in another Member State.89 The CJEU followed similar lines of 
argumentation in two other sports cases, i.e. Lehtonen90 and Olympique Lyonnais.91 
                                          
83 Case C-287/05, Hendrix, ECLI:EU:C:2007:494. 
84 Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463; see also case C-208/05, ITC, ECLI:EU:C:2007:16, in 
relation to national legislation which provided that the fees due to private sector employment agencies 
would be reimbursed by the State only if the employment was subject to compulsory social security 
contributions in that State; and case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Bernard, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, 
with annotation by J. Lindholm (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1187. 
85 Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 95. 
86 Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 96. 
87 Ibid, paragraph 103 (emphasis added); the CJEU thus distinguishes the ‘selling arrangements’ referred to 
in the context of the free movement of goods in joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:905. 
88 A similar line was followed in the services case; case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:126, paragraph 38. 
89 The CJEU also clarified that the transfer fee could not be equated to ‘certain selling arrangements’ 
excluded by the Keck ruling from the scope of application of the free movement of goods provisions.  
90 Case C-176/96, Lehtonen, ECLI:EU:C:2000:201. 
91 C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143. 
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This so-called ‘sporting exemption’ means that the non-economic aspects of sport as 
well as those economic aspects which are motivated by purely sporting interests fall 
outside the scope of the prohibition rules as long as the respective rules are not 
disproportionate. The maintenance of the proper functioning of competitions and of 
the integrity and ethical values of sport, as well as the upkeep of the competitive 
balance and the recruitment of new, in particular young, personnel are justifications 
which have been developed by the CJEU in its case law on sports. These may set an 
example for exceptions in other fields which fall outside the range of the Treaty 
provisions on freedom of movement. 
Obstacles to movement are usually experienced and challenged retrospectively, as 
penalties exacted after the movement – it is not necessary to show that an obstacle 
has affected the decision of whether to exercise free movement in the first place.  
An example of a penalty for exercising free movement once having returned to the 
home State was evident in Terhoeve.92 The Netherlands subjected Mr Terhoeve, a 
Dutch national, to rules which overall created a heavier social security burden than 
would have been the case if he, in otherwise identical circumstances, had not been a 
migrant worker in the UK for part of the year. The CJEU, taking a very similar 
approach to that in Bosman, held that a national of a Member State could be deterred 
from leaving the Member State in which he or she resides in order to pursue an 
activity as an employed person in the territory of another Member State if he or she 
were required to pay greater social security contributions than if he or she had not 
moved, without thereby being entitled to additional social benefits such as to 
compensate for that increase.93 It followed, in the view of the CJEU, that national 
legislation of the kind at issue in the main proceedings constituted an obstacle to 
freedom of movement for workers, in principle prohibited by Article 45 TFEU, and it 
was therefore unnecessary to consider whether there was indirect discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, prohibited by the Treaty or by Article 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) 
No 1612/68.94  
The temporal connection with work can be at the point of claim, on return to the home 
Member State, or else prior to the return. Someone who returns to their home State 
and is not at that point a worker, but experiences a welfare penalty for having worked 
in another Member State can invoke that the application of the rules at issue 
constitutes an obstacle (as well as discrimination on grounds of migration).  
In Swaddling95 a UK national had worked in France but returned to the UK, the home 
State, as a jobseeker. There, the UK required all applicants for income support (the 
means-tested jobseeker’s benefit at the time) to be resident for eight weeks before 
they could be considered habitually resident. The CJEU found that “the length of 
residence in the Member State in which payment of the benefit at issue is sought 
cannot be regarded as an intrinsic element of the concept of residence”, and that 
someone in the applicants’ position ought to be able to be considered habitually 
resident “at the time of applying” for the benefit, if he or she “intends to remain in his 
State of origin, where his close relatives live”. 
 
Examples  
 
                                          
92 Case C-18/95, F.C. Terhoeve, ECLI:EU:C:1999:22. For another example of an ‘exit’ restriction see case C-
109/04, Kranemann, ECLI:EU:C:2005:187; see also case C-352/06, Bosmann, ECLI:EU:C:2008:290. 
93 Ibid, paragraph 40. 
94 Ibid, paragraph 41. 
95 Case C-90/97, Swaddling, ECLI:EU:C:1999:96. 
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In case C-464/02, Commission v Denmark,96 and case C-232/01, Van Lent,97 national 
rules prohibiting workers domiciled in one Member State from using a vehicle 
registered in another Member State were condemned as they might preclude the 
workers from exercising their free movement rights or might impede labour market 
access in another Member State.  
In case C-285/01, Burbaud,98 a French condition of employment in the hospital public 
service was passing a competition such as the National School of Public Health (ENSP) 
entrance examination. The CJEU considered that such a requirement was clearly an 
obstacle affecting access to the employment concerned, since passing the examination 
was a precondition for being admitted to the ENSP's training course, which is, in turn, 
a precondition for access to the employment concerned.   
Case C-40/05, Lyyski v Umeå universitet,99 concerned a Swedish rule that required an 
individual wanting to follow a special teacher training course at a designated university 
in Sweden to be employed at a Swedish school to complete the practical component of 
the training. The CJEU held that the requirement was an obstacle to the freedom of 
movement that could place persons such as Mr Lyyski, who was employed at a 
Swedish-speaking school in Finland, at a disadvantage. The CJEU however went on to 
state that the measure was justified on the grounds of preserving or improving the 
education system, and that it was proportionate. 
The ‘liable to hamper or render less attractive’ formula is very broad. It is not 
surprising then that in subsequent case law the CJEU also attempted to curb the 
potential breadth of the Bosman formula.  
In Graf,100 for instance, Mr Graf quit his employment in Austria to take up a position in 
Germany. The Austrian legislation provided for compensation for termination of 
employment when such termination resulted from a decision not attributable to the 
employee. Since Mr Graf had voluntarily quit his occupation, he was not entitled to 
any compensation. Relying on a literal interpretation of the Bosman ruling, Mr Graf 
argued that the rule constituted an obstacle to his right to move to take up 
employment in another Member State, since the prospect of losing the right to be 
compensated discouraged him from moving. The CJEU was not impressed by the 
submission, as in order to be considered an obstacle to movement, the rule has to 
affect “access of the worker to the labour market”.101 In the case at issue, that was 
not so: 
“Legislation of the kind at issue in the main proceedings is not such as to preclude or 
deter a worker from ending his contract of employment in order to take a job with 
another employer, because the entitlement to compensation on termination of 
employment is not dependent on the worker's choosing whether or not to stay with his 
current employer but on a future and hypothetical event, namely the subsequent 
termination of his contract without such termination being at his own initiative or 
attributable to him”. 
In Graf, therefore, the CJEU more precisely defined the boundaries of Article 45 TFEU: 
not every rule which might potentially discourage movement is an obstacle caught by 
that Article. Rather, the rule needs to affect access to the employment market in a 
way that is not too uncertain and indirect.  
                                          
96 Case C-464/02, Commission v Denmark, ECLI:EU:C:2005:546. 
97 Case C-232/01, Van Lent, ECLI:EU:C:2003:535. 
98 Case C-285/01, Burbaud, ECLI:EU:C:2003:432. 
99 Case C-40/05, Lyyski v Umeå universitet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:10. 
100 Case C-190/98, Graf, ECLI:EU:C:2000:49. 
101 Paragraph 23 (emphasis added). 
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In Deliège,102 the CJEU was once again seized with the question of the compatibility 
with Community law of rules regulating sporting activity. Even though the case related 
to the free movement of services, the rationale of the case could be easily transposed 
to the scope of Article 45 TFEU. Here, the claimant attacked the selection process to 
be able to take part in an international judo championship. If the Bosman ruling were 
to be applied mechanically, it could be argued that such rules constituted an obstacle 
to movement, since the fact that Ms Deliège had not been selected meant that she 
could not go to another Member State to take part in the championship. The CJEU, 
however, wisely avoided such interpretation. It held that even though the rules at 
issue inevitably limited the number of participants in sporting competitions, they “were 
inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports event”103 and so could not 
be a restriction on the freedom to provide services.  
So not all non-discriminatory rules are to be considered as an obstacle to the free 
movement of workers, as otherwise all rules regulating any aspect of employment 
activity would have to be justified. Rather, in order to be considered a barrier to the 
free movement rights a non-discriminatory rule must: 
 apply to the entry and residence of migrants; or 
 affect access to the employment market; or  
 apply in any other way specifically to the transfer of the migrant from one 
Member State to another for the purposes of exercising Treaty rights. 
The argument against drawing a distinction between national rules which might hinder 
free movement, and those which do not, is that such a distinction is difficult to draw in 
practice, since rules which relate to, say, the terms and conditions of employment, or 
to the tax treatment of residents, might, if unduly burdensome, be said to deter 
workers of other Member States from entering the employment market of the host 
State. Moreover, it cannot be said that all the CJEU’s case law is consistent with the 
proposition that non-discriminatory rules need only be justified if they hinder access to 
the employment market – it is possible that detrimental effects on the conditions of 
work/providing services are capable of being obstacles.  
For instance, recently in the case S and G the Grand Chamber examined the case of 
two Dutch nationals who were claiming family rights in the Netherlands on the basis of 
the fact that they travelled to another Member State for work: Mr S only once a week; 
Mr G every day.104 The CJEU clarified that whilst the intra-Union element is established 
by frontier workers, in order to obtain residency rights for the family on the basis of 
the Treaty, the claimant had to show that refusal of such rights would entail an 
interference with his right to move.105 The CJEU also acknowledged that the fact that 
the family member was taking care of the Union citizen’s children might be a relevant 
consideration, but only insofar as the children are looked after by the spouse. The 
mere desirability of children being cared for by their grandparents is not in itself 
sufficient to have a dissuasive effect on the right to move. 
                                          
102 Joined cases C-51/96 and 191/97, Deliège, ECLI:EU:C:2000:199. 
103 Paragraph 64.  
104 Case C-457/12, S and G, ECLI:EU:C:2014:136; see also case C-60/00, Carpenter, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434. 
105 As mentioned in footnote 34, in O and B the CJEU held that if the migrant has resided in another Member 
State satisfying the conditions set out in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38, then an obstacle to movement 
will be presumed. 
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2.4 Justification of national measures 
Indirect discrimination can be justified by imperative requirements of public interest as 
well as by the Treaty derogations (public policy and public security106). In order to be 
justified by an imperative requirement: 
 
a) the rule must pursue an aim compatible with Union law; 
b) the restriction it imposes on the right must be necessary and proportionate;  
c) the national rule must also comply with fundamental rights as protected by the 
Charter.  
2.4.1 The aim compatible with EU law 
The CJEU very rarely challenges the aim invoked by the Member States; in order to be 
compatible with Union law the rule must simply pursue a public interest; and must not 
be protectionist. An economic aim can be taken into account by the rules, but it 
cannot be the only reason to impose the measure that has discriminatory effects. For 
instance, in SETTG,107 a case concerning the free movement of services, Greek law 
provided that tourist guides should be employed under an employment contract (so 
that they could not provide services as self-employed persons). In order to justify the 
rule the Greek government relied on the ‘need to maintain industrial peace’, since this 
legislation was passed in order to bring labour disputes to an end. The CJEU held the 
following:  
“However, maintaining industrial peace as a means of bringing a collective labour 
dispute to an end and thereby preventing any adverse effects on an economic sector, 
and consequently on the economy of the State, must be regarded as an economic aim 
which cannot constitute a reason relating to the general interest that justifies a 
restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty.” 
2.4.2 Necessary and proportionate 
In order to be legitimate, a rule which has discriminatory effects must be necessary to 
achieve the stated aim, i.e. it must be the least restrictive means to do so, as well as 
proportionate, i.e. the interference on the free movement right must not be out of 
proportion with the interest pursued (e.g. if the interest pursued is purely marginal, 
and the interference very great then the rule will be disproportionate). Whilst, as said 
above, the CJEU is quite ready to accept the policy interests put forward by the 
Member States, it carefully scrutinises the necessity and proportionality of the rules.  
One example is the above-mentioned case of O’Flynn, which related to a grant to help 
with funeral costs of relatives. This grant was confined to burials to take place in the 
UK. The CJEU accepted that the UK might legitimately want to avoid ‘prohibitive costs 
and practical difficulties’ when administering the benefit. However, the CJEU focused 
on the effect of the measures, and found that they were simply not appropriate – 
costs of transport were irrelevant since they were not reimbursed, while the cost paid 
for the funeral could be kept down by other measures, such as fixing a lump sum or 
                                          
106 Public health is not particularly relevant, as it has never been tested and unlike security and policy 
cannot be used to expel citizens after the initial three months. It cannot be regarded as an adequate 
justification for discrimination and for indirect discrimination. 
107 Case C-398/95, Syndesmos ton en Elladi Touristikon kai Taxidiotikon Grafeion v Ypourgos Ergasias, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:282, paragraph 23. 
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limiting the amount of the reimbursement to a given amount having regard to the 
normal cost of burial in the United Kingdom.108   
In Groener,109 discussed above, the CJEU found that a potentially discriminatory rule 
requiring a degree of competence in the Irish language for posts of Assistant Lecturer 
and Lecturer in Ireland, could be justified, notwithstanding the fact that for the post in 
question the candidate would be working “essentially, or indeed exclusively in 
English”.110 The Treaty, it was found, “does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the 
protection and promotion of a language of a Member State which is both the national 
language and the first official language"111 and centres of education would be 
particularly important for such a policy.112 However, this policy must not be 
administered in a discriminatory way – e.g. by requiring the language to be learned in 
a given territory,113 or requiring a level of knowledge disproportionate to the objective 
pursued.114  
2.4.3 Respecting fundamental rights 
Finally, in order to be compatible with Union law a rule which limits a free movement 
provision must also be compatible with fundamental rights as protected by the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. This principle originates in case law (Rutili)115 and is based on 
the assumption that a limitation to a Treaty right falls within the scope of the Treaty. 
as such it must respect the constitutional principles of the Union including fundamental 
rights protection. It has now been codified in Article 51(1) of the Charter, which 
provides that the latter applies to the act of the Member States when they implement 
Union law. For instance, in Carpenter, a case relating to the free movement of services 
but the principles of which apply to all migrants, the CJEU held that a rule which 
denied a residence permit to the spouse of a service provider falling within the scope 
of Union law could only be compatible with EU law if its application did not have the 
effect of impinging unduly on the applicant’s right to family life, as guaranteed by the 
(then) general principles of Union law.  
2.5 Summary 
Article 45 TFEU applies to rules that: 
 discriminate directly on grounds of nationality, e.g. only Italians can work for 
the Ministry of Defence; those rules can be justified by relying on the public 
service derogations (e.g. only Italians can be appointed in the higher ranks of 
the Italian army); 
 discriminate indirectly on grounds of nationality, e.g. in order to be employed 
in a school a worker needs to be fluent in Italian; those rules can be justified 
on imperative grounds of public interest provided they are necessary and 
proportionate (e.g. fluency requirement would be justified for a teacher but not 
for a cleaner); 
 impose a barrier to the ability or desirability of the worker to move, or impose 
a barrier to market access, e.g. a worker returning to Italy after having worked 
                                          
108 Case C-237/94, O’Flynn, ECLI:EU:C:1996:206, paragraph 27-29. 
109 Case C-379/87, Groener v Minister for Education, ECLI:EU:C:1989:599. 
110 Ibid, 15. 
111 Ibid, 19. 
112 Ibid, 20. 
113 Ibid, 23. 
114 Ibid, 21. 
115 Case C-36/75, Rutili, ECLI:EU:C:1975:137. 
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3 Analysis of free movement of workers case law: 
problematic areas and case strategy 
3.1 General: discrimination on ground of migration 
Even before the introduction of the obstacle approach, the CJEU did not restrict itself 
to a pure discrimination approach. It did not hesitate to tackle both cases based on 
nationality discrimination and cases rather dealing with discrimination based on 
migration, regardless of the claimant’s nationality.116 The comparison was thus not 
always between the national and the non-national, but often also between the migrant 
and the static worker.117 This is logical, as the exercise of free movement rights should 
of course not be penalised in national legislation.  
Initially the obstacle approach appeared a radically different route of challenge. It was 
considered to be the potential start of an era in which all regulation could be attacked, 
whether or not discriminatory. However, given the broad notion of discrimination 
already used in earlier case law, the immediate restrictive interpretation of the 
Bosman case law (no hindrance to market access, too remote effect on free 
movement) and the rather modest line of true non-discrimination cases, the difference 
is marginal in practice. If there is no substantial hindrance to market access or if the 
connection with free movement is too remote, the non-discriminatory rules concerned 
will not breach the Treaty (and therefore will not have to be justified). All in all, most 
of the free movement of persons cases could be treated using a discrimination 
approach, albeit discrimination based on migration rather than nationality 
discrimination. 
The language of obstacles is in itself perhaps a bit misleading, since the cases 
predominantly deal with obstacles to movement rather than mere obstacles to market 
access experienced after movement. Moreover, the obstacle definitions point to 
measures likely to preclude or deter a national from exercising free movement, but no 
evidence is required of that likelihood. Nor in the context of the subsequent penalty do 
claimants need to show the numbers of people affected, or even to show that 
migrants are disproportionately affected – the cases are decided on whether an 
individual has suffered a migration penalty.  
In spite of the differences in approach outlined above, the two concepts of obstacle 
and discrimination do seem to be converging: in fact, if one were to go back to the 
O’Flynn definition of indirect discrimination to include any discrimination on grounds of 
movement or migration, most if not all cases described above (and many more) would 
be easily explained.  
Thus, for instance, Mr Bosman was penalised because he wanted to move from one 
club to another; Mr Terhoeve was disadvantaged because he had resided and worked 
in another Member State; Mr Kraus was discriminated because he had studied in 
another Member State etc.  
The construct of discrimination on grounds of movement might help making ‘obstacle’ 
arguments more accessible in national courts by framing them as a familiar, hard legal 
concept (discrimination), and accepting the inherent limits hinted at by the Bosman 
case law, that only measures penalising the exercise of free movement rights be 
caught, naturally excluding national sports team selection processes, or compensation 
                                          
116 Cf case C-370/90, Singh, ECLI:EU:C:1992:296, and case C-224/98, D’Hoop, ECLI:EU:C:2002:432. 
117 E.g. see the discrimination test in case C-237/94, O’Flynn, ECLI:EU:C:1996:206. 
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reserved for involuntary unemployment. Thus, discrimination on grounds of migration 
has the advantage of creating clearer boundaries (therefore making it easier to apply 
law) to the free movement of persons, whilst at the same time being less intrusive to 
national regulatory autonomy.    
National measures which discriminate, not on grounds of nationality, but by placing at 
a disadvantage those who have exercised their right of free movement as compared to 
those who have not, are already regarded as impeding the exercise of freedom of 
movement.118 Yet, once a migrant worker has secured entry and residence in a 
Member State, gained access to the employment market of a Member State, and is 
pursuing employed activities in that State, it will not be possible to object to national 
rules concerning, for example, the terms and conditions of employment, or the tax 
treatment of residents, solely on the ground that they might be described as 
excessively burdensome to those subject to them. Once integrated into the economic 
and social life of the host State, the migrant worker’s fundamental right derived from 
Article 45 TFEU is the right to equality of treatment, in law and in fact.119  
The language of discrimination on the grounds of migration appears to surface in a 
number of cases, in which the CJEU has criticised unfavourable treatment on the sole 
ground of having exercised a free movement right.120 Similarly, the CJEU invoked the 
concept of an obstacle to movement in R v Baumbast121 in order to find that 
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 – providing for the equal treatment of migrant workers 
– which created a right to access education for children under the best possible 
conditions, meant that the child of a migrant worker was entitled to be accompanied 
by its primary carer during its studies.  
“[T]o prevent a child of a citizen of the Union from continuing his education in the host 
Member State by refusing him permission to remain might dissuade that citizen from 
exercising the rights to freedom of movement laid down in Article 39 EC and would 
therefore create an obstacle to the effective exercise of the freedom thus guaranteed 
by the EC Treaty.” 
This principle was further aligned with the concept of non-discrimination/equal 
treatment in Teixeira122 and Ibrahim,123 where it was found that a Baumbast carer’s 
right of residence was not contingent upon sufficient resources – i.e. entitling them to 
equal access to social assistance, based on the migrant work of the child’s parent.   
It might aid clarity were the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of migration to 
be made explicit, and its limits clearly outlined. It would seem to apply to non-workers 
exercising other free movement rights.  
                                          
118 The CJEU has held that the provisions of the Treaty relating to the free movement of persons are thus 
intended to facilitate the pursuit by Union citizens of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the 
Community, and preclude national legislation which might place Union citizens at a disadvantage when they 
wish to extend their activities beyond the territory of a single Member State. See case C-143/87, 
Christopher Stanton and SA belge d'assurances ‘L'Étoile 1905’ v Inasti (Institut national d'assurances 
sociales pour travailleurs indépendants), paragraph 13. 
119 If a restriction on access to the market is imposed on a migrant after his or her integration into the 
economic and social life of the host State, this does not of course preclude it being regarded as a restriction 
on access to the market, and it will be required to be justified even if non-discriminatory. Thus, if a 
restriction such as the one at issue in case C-19/92, Kraus, ECLI:EU:C:1993:125, is of its nature a 
restriction on access to the market, and it is immaterial whether it is invoked as against a new market 
entrant, or as against a person already pursuing the relevant economic activity.  
120 See the obstacles cases (not all dealing with workers): case C-224/98, D’Hoop, ECLI:EU:C:2002:432; 
case C-224/02, Pusa, ECLI:EU:C:2004:273; case C-619/11, Chassart, ECLI:EU:C:2013:92; joined cases C-
523/11 and C-585/11, Prinz and Seeberger, ECLI:EU:C:2013:524; case C-192/05, Tas Hagen & Tas, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:676; case C-406/04, De Cuyper, ECLI:EU:C:2006:491. 
121 Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R, ECLI:EU:C:2002:493. 
122 Case C-480/08, Texiera, ECLI:EU:C:2010:83, with annotation by C. O’Brien (2011) 48 Common Market 
Law Review 203; M J Elsmore (2010) 35 European Law Review 571. 
123 Case C-310/08, Ibrahim, ECLI:EU:C:2010:80. 
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3.2 The impact of the worker status 
3.2.1 The persons affected are workers 
In order to receive maximum protection from indirect discrimination, a migrant should 
be classified as a worker. The definition provided by the CJEU is set out above, but 
there are a number of ‘fringes’ to the definition and many people performing work124 
may be deprived of equal treatment rights if they are found to be non-workers. Key 
issues are set out below: 
1. Bettray, rehabilitative work and disability 
It is unclear whether the Bettray-Trojani approach would apply beyond work schemes 
which aim at reintegrating people who suffer from addiction. In Birden,125 in the 
context of the Turkish Association Agreement, the CJEU held that the ruling in Bettray 
was confined to the facts of the particular case and could therefore not be extended to 
a State-sponsored working scheme aimed at (re-)introducing those in receipt of social 
assistance into the employment market. It remains to be seen whether special 
schemes aimed at ensuring the employment of people with disabilities, where the 
work is tailored to the person rather than the person tailored to the work, would fall 
within the scope of Article 45 TFEU. Given, however, that disabled people might find it 
difficult to exercise their free movement rights at best of times;126 that work in those 
cases allows the worker to significantly improve his or her ‛living conditions‘; that the 
Treaty free movement provisions should be given a broad interpretation; and that 
such interpretation should be consistent with fundamental rights including the need to 
respect human dignity, it is to be hoped that special schemes aimed at encouraging 
the participation of disabled and vulnerable people to the labour market would fall 
within the scope of Article 45 TFEU.  
Where possible, migrants performing work should be classified as workers, in order to 
maximise their protection from indirect discrimination and their protection from 
obstacles to movement. The limits of Bettray can be challenged where a migrant is 
performing re-integrating or rehabilitative work, with reference to disability equality 
duties, including Article 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, (regarding the social and occupational integration of persons with disabilities), 
and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to which the EU is a 
signatory. 
2. Remuneration, apprenticeships, and benefit conditional work programmes 
                                          
124 The varying labour market developments in the Member States during the last two decades were 
accompanied by an altered composition of employment. In particular, there is a greater spread of work 
arrangements and a growth in non-standard work such as part-time employment, fixed-term contracts, 
agency work and zero-hours contracts (‘standard work’ usually being considered as working full-time in a 
permanent job, which implies a clear link to a certain employer and offers in addition, as a rule, full access 
to the social security system). Non-standard work is often, but not always, treated as precarious work 
associated with poor pay, low working hours and limited access to social security, whereas, for instance, 
part-time work may in certain periods of the life course, such as education and vocational training or family 
and care work be, however, of interest for individuals because it offers an opportunity to reconcile different 
activities. 
125 Case C-1/97, Birden, ECLI:EU:C:1998:568. 
126 Consider that the comprehensive health insurance requirement makes it prohibitively expensive for those 
with serious health conditions to reside in a State different from the State of nationality unless they are 
employed or self-employed. 
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Work needs to be remunerated, but the concept of remuneration is flexible, so that a 
quid pro quo such as board and lodging might count as remuneration.127 The stress on 
remuneration, rather than on the ‘economic value’ of the work performed, leaves open 
some loopholes, especially during economic downturns. Here, consider that it is not 
unusual for young people looking to enter the labour market to engage in unpaid work 
in order to better their chances of finding a job.128 This work (internships, 
apprenticeships etc) is often of economic value for the employer and yet the fact that 
it attracts no remuneration might leave a vulnerable section of workers devoid of 
protection in European law.129 Furthermore, this gap in protection might have 
discriminatory effects since those ‘internships’ are often seen (or promised to be) the 
first step towards remunerated employment – they are themselves measures that 
facilitate access to the labour market. A similar situation is faced by those performing 
compulsory work activity as a condition of receipt of benefits – government work 
programmes that might require substantial services without remuneration beyond the 
benefit in question.  
Member States may police the definition of worker rather rigidly, so that those who 
work are in fact treated as economically inactive, and so subject to indirectly 
discriminatory rules that would not be justified if applied to workers. This can result in 
those taking part in the activities above being excluded from rights, and can also 
result in an over-emphasis upon remuneration to the detriment of part-time workers.  
An example from the UK includes the new Minimum Earnings Threshold, which is only 
applied to EU nationals. If EU migrants earn less than £153 per week, they are subject 
to a ‘genuine and effective test’ to ascertain whether they are nevertheless a 
worker.130 The decision maker guidance accompanying the test gives cause to think 
that the ‘genuine and effective’ test may be more narrowly applied than CJEU case law 
suggests, potentially excluding part-time workers from automatic equal treatment 
rights. For example, the guidance states that ‘part-time work is not necessarily always 
marginal and ancillary’.131 As a statement of probability, this suggests that part-time 
work is usually marginal and ancillary.    
If faced with discriminatory/obstacle internship or work programme cases, the 
Commission should push for the situations to be viewed as interferences with Article 
45 TFEU, requesting that the CJEU look at those cases much as a national court would 
do, focussing on the ‘subordinate’ nature of the relationship; the extent to which the 
subject has the freedom to fail to turn up for work and so on. The same should be said 
in relation to atypical work contracts, such as zero-hours contracts, where the 
employee is required to be at the disposal of the employer even though the employer 
might not be obliged to provide work (immediately or on a regular basis) to the 
employee. It is the limitation upon the workers’ freedom to refuse work that should 
determine whether they are in employment or not.  
Any definitional limitations upon migrant work should be monitored, and where they 
impact significantly upon part-time workers, can be challenged.  
                                          
127 Case C-196/87, Steymann, ECLI:EU:C:1988:475; in the context of the Turkey Association Agreement 
but of broader relevance; case C-294/06, Payir and others, ECLI:EU:C:2008:36. 
128 Low or even unpaid work can be combined with other activities such as education or vocational training. 
For instance, a marginal, low-paid or even unpaid work arrangement with a well-known undertaking as 
employer might be recognised as a stepping stone for a successful professional career. 
129 For some examples of unpaid ‘internships’ see e.g. http://www.internshipinlondon.com/search-
results.php; for the purposes of UK law, see the guidance from the Department for work and pensions, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/197222/11-1216-national-
minimum-wage-worker-checklist.pdf. 
130 Department of Work and Pensions Press Release: ‘Minimum earnings threshold for EEA migrants 
introduced’, 21 February 2014, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/minimum-earnings-
threshold-for-eea-migrants-introduced. 
131 DMG 1/14 JSA(IB) – Right to reside – establishing whether an EEA national is/was a “worker” or a “self-
employed person”, DMA Leeds, February 2014. 
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3. Problems retaining worker status 
The provisions for retaining worker status in Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 include 
significant gaps. These provisions have recently been found to be non-exhaustive, in 
St Prix.132 In this case, it was found that a worker who temporarily ceases work during 
later stages of pregnancy, or during a maternity period, can retain worker status. In 
the light of this, further gaps could usefully be challenged, for example if employment 
is temporarily interrupted due to caring obligations,133 which can result in a 
punctuated work record.  
Migrant workers seeking to rely on Article 7(3) (b) or (c), as persons who have 
become unemployed and subsequently seek work, might fall foul of the technical 
requirements Member States impose drawing upon those provisions. The 
unemployment must be ‘duly recorded’. This means that a recently unemployed 
migrant worker who does not register with the public employment agency, because he 
or she does not want to claim benefits, and instead seeks work using his or her own 
resources, will not retain worker status during the intervening period.134 If he or she 
subsequently registers with the public employment agency, he or she may be found to 
have done so with ‘undue delay’ (the test in the UK) and so not retain worker status 
and not be entitled to benefits.   
There is also a risk, given the growth of zero-hour contracts, that a worker will cease 
to be considered a worker (he or she will have done his or her last shift) before he or 
she even knows that his or her employment has come to an end, if he or she is 
waiting to hear about further shifts. By the time it is clear no further shifts are coming, 
he or she will have been considered to have lost and not retained worker status.135 
The Commission should be alive to measures that discriminate against migrant 
workers once they have become unemployed, challenging narrow definitions of 
retained worker status, and arguing that such restrictions defy the broad approach to 
be taken to defining workers under Article 45 TFEU. Measures that automatically 
penalise migrants for not immediately registering with employment agencies, by 
stripping them of worker status and of associated protections, can be challenged. Such 
measures, and any ensuing discriminatory benefit eligibility policy (such as the loss of 
Housing Benefit in the UK) could constitute ex ante obstacles to movement, because 
they mean that migrant work entails a significant social risk.  
4. Reflecting modern labour market patterns 
In recent years the pattern of transnational migration has changed drastically. In the 
past one striking feature of labour migration was the interest of host countries in low-
skilled workers. Today, technological change deeply influences the demand for skills in 
the labour market, insofar as the percentage of workers with tertiary education has 
increased considerably, and better cognitive and non-cognitive competences are 
needed even for low-skilled tasks. Accordingly, there is a growing demand for high-
skilled jobs and a decrease in demand for medium-skilled and low-qualified jobs. 
Education and vocational training is necessary in order to access the labour market. 
                                          
132 Case C-507/12, Jessy Saint Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007. 
133 Which are not covered in Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38. 
134 UK case law requires there not to be ‘undue delay’ in registering with Jobcentre Plus following 
unemployment. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v MK, CIS/2423/2009. 
135 A risk evident in the UK, Upper Tribunal case VP v Secretary for Works and Pensions (JSA) [2014] UKUT 
32 (AAC); judge Ward found that even where a claimant was “reasonably in my view, hanging on in the 
hope of further work from [his employer]” this nevertheless resulted in undue delay in registering for JSA. 
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Furthermore, there are new kinds of atypical employment which blur the borderline 
between work and non-work. An allocation of rights according to the traditional 
concept of worker is therefore just as anachronistic as the traditional ‘9 to 5’ work 
organisation. EU law concerning the freedom of movement of workers must take 
account of these changes. From a wider perspective, Europe as a whole has to adapt 
to new political, economic and social circumstances, which require a new approach to 
the free movement of workers. The high rate of unemployment in many Member 
States also reflects a need for a more effective European employment strategy as well 
as a broader concept of European citizenship. It is against the background of all the 
European policies relevant in this context that free movement of workers has to be 
seen. Measures should focus on a clearer, more up-to-date and efficient legal 
framework on free movement for European workers as well as a more transparent and 
efficient labour market in Europe which will allow free movement under optimum 
conditions. 
3.2.2 Different routes to coverage 
1. Applying the broader personal scope of ‘obstacles’ to non-nationals 
Protection from indirect discrimination is considerably stronger for workers than for 
other categories of migrants. Prima facie indirect discrimination is more readily 
justified in the context of non-workers, including students,136 on the grounds of 
requiring some degree of social integration, through e.g. residence requirements. The 
prohibition of obstacles to movement has a potentially broader personal scope, with 
strong presumptions against obstacles not only for workers, but for students and 
citizens too.  
In D’Hoop,137 a Belgian national had completed her secondary education in France. 
She returned to Belgium, studied at a Belgian university, and after graduation claimed 
the Belgian tide-over allowance, a benefit granted to ‘young people who have just 
completed their studies and are seeking their first employment’. This was refused, as 
a condition of entitlement was completing secondary education in Belgium, or in 
another Member State if she was the dependent child of migrant workers (she was not 
– her parents were resident in Belgium throughout). The CJEU found that an own 
State national should not be treated less favourably because he or she has “availed 
[him or herself] of the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of 
movement”.138 Those opportunities “could not be fully effective if a national of a 
Member State could be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles raised on 
his return to his country of origin by legislation penalising the fact that he has used 
them.”139 The opportunities go beyond work – the issue being “particularly important 
in the field of education” given the Union’s aims of “encouraging mobility of 
students”.140   
In Morgan and Bucher141 the CJEU similarly readily engaged with the question of 
whether a measure that allocated student grants for study abroad only to those whose 
studies had started in Germany was an obstacle to movement. It found that it was 
“liable, on account of the personal inconvenience, additional costs and possible delays 
which it entails, to discourage citizens of the Union from leaving the Federal Republic 
                                          
136 Case C-158/07, Förster, ECLI:EU:C:2008:630. 
137 Case C-224/98, D’Hoop, ECLI:EU:C:2002:432. 
138 Ibid, 30. 
139 Ibid, 31. 
140 Ibid, 32. 
141 Joined cases C-11/06 and C-12/06, Morgan and Bucher, ECLI:EU:C:2007:626. 
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of Germany in order to pursue studies in another Member State and thus from availing 
themselves of their freedom to move and reside in that Member State”. It then turned 
to questions of justification, and found that the many arguments put forward by the 
German authorities were not sufficiently commensurate, appropriate, proportionate, or 
well-evidenced in order to create justification.  
While obstacle arguments have typically only been raised in the context of own-State 
returning EU migrants, the convergence of obstacles and discrimination logic around 
the concept of migration discrimination means that obstacle arguments can logically 
be deployed in the context of non-national EU migrants as well. However, this might 
mean that the force of the argument gets watered down, since the case law is 
especially disapproving of Member States who penalise their own nationals for moving, 
and may be less stringent when it comes to non-nationals, reflecting the approach 
taken in indirect discrimination case law.  
Where possible, it would be advisable to characterise migrants as workers in order to 
trigger the strongest obligations under both indirect discrimination and obstacles to 
movement. In this context, the logic of the obstacles case law could be extended to 
cover non-nationals, and with it the strong presumption against obstacles, and the 
presumed heavy burden of proof (and difficulty of justification) placed on Member 
States. When dealing with non-workers who are non-nationals, connections to work, 
such as jobseeking, or former work should be stressed. Once the obstacle logic has 
become more firmly established in the case law on non-nationals, in the context of 
work, it could be possible to explore reliance purely on a person’s EU citizenship 
status.  
2. Getting agreement that the affected migrants are workers 
It can be difficult in some cases to establish ‘work’, especially in the light of some 
national divergence. In some cases, the CJEU may not make a finding as to whether a 
migrant is a worker, but devolve that question back to national courts.  
 
For instance in Raccanelli,142 the provisions for creating two routes of doctoral study – 
one under a grant system, and the other recognising the students as employees, was 
challenged by an Italian student with a grant. He claimed he was performing the same 
duties as the German students recognised as workers. The CJEU re-stated the key 
features of an employment relationship, and said it was for the referring court to find 
the facts to establish whether such a relationship existed. It then added rather briefly 
that the institute in question was bound by the principle of non-discrimination, and 
that it was for the referring court to find out whether domestic and foreign workers 
had been treated differently.  
 
If the Commission were to take action that hinged upon accepting that those affected 
are workers, it should include factual evidence that speaks to the components of the 
working relationship (services performed under the supervision of another in return for 
remuneration). It would also be advisable to outline grounds that include the 
prohibition of obstacles to movement for students/citizens as appropriate to help to 
provide an argument ‘in the alternative’. 
3. Emphasising that the free movement of workers requires access to host State 
labour markets 
                                          
142 Case C-94/07, Raccanelli, ECLI:EU:C:2008:425. 
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The protection of jobseekers under Article 45 TFEU, and their alignment with workers, 
could be better emphasised by recognising the (limited) protection from equal 
treatment to which they are entitled, and stressing that any obstacle-to-movement 
case arises primarily out of Article 45 TFEU rather than Article 18 TFEU, which can be 
raised secondarily and in the alternative.  
Obstacles to the labour market that obstruct a migrant’s ability to become a worker in 
another Member State may be clear infringements of the fundamental freedom of 
movement for ‘workers’, even though they primarily affect jobseekers, since they 
affect the overall patterns of movement and employment. It should be noted here that 
by classifying jobseekers as simply economically inactive citizens, Member States may 
be erecting significant obstacles to the labour market by making it difficult to reside 
and seek work in the territory.  
Examples of such obstacles in the UK include the residence requirement of three 
months before Jobseeker’s Allowance can be claimed143 – which goes further than is 
necessary to establish that someone is genuinely jobseeking, as over half of all 
jobseekers find work within three months in the UK.144 Moreover, the measure creates 
an obstacle to movement for own nationals who cannot, contrary to the CJEU ruling in 
Swaddling,145 be considered habitually resident at the point of claim. Another example 
is the withdrawal of Housing Benefit from jobseekers,146 as the low level of Jobseekers’ 
Allowance in the UK means that migrants face a substantial rent shortfall,147 and so 
cannot maintain a residence, calling the meaning of a right ‘to reside’ as a jobseeker 
into question, and highlighting the problematic classification of benefits as social 
assistance where they are necessary for jobseeking to be possible. The exclusion 
applies to all EU national jobseekers, not just newly arrived ones. As there are several 
obstacles to retaining worker status, discussed at 3.2.1 (3) above, this will affect 
former workers. These measures reflect the UK government’s contentious desire to 
reduce immigration from the EU.148      
The use of Article 45 TFEU in the context of access to the labour market could help to 
avoid a situation in which the biggest obstacles to the free movement of workers are 
obstacles that prevent migrants from becoming migrant workers in the first place, or 
from regaining migrant worker status. This could be combined with contesting indirect 
discrimination, whenever the measures in question can be framed as restricting access 
to benefits that facilitate access to the labour market. Measures that make it more 
difficult for own State nationals to seek work having worked elsewhere in the EU 
should be identified and challenged.  
The Commission may also contribute to the task of distinguishing benefits that 
facilitate access to the labour market from social assistance lawfully withheld from 
jobseekers according to Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38. It would be useful to set 
out some clear benchmarks for subsistence without which a migrant cannot 
meaningfully seek work and therefore cannot get access to the labour market.   
                                          
143 The Social Security (Jobseeker’s Allowance: Habitual Residence) Amendment Regulations 2013 SI 2013 
No 3196. 
144 DWP ‘The Jobseeker's Allowance (Habitual Residence) Amendment Regulations 2013’ Impact assessment 
16/12/2013 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2013/230/pdfs/ukia_20130230_en.pdf, last accessed 13 
August 2013, 5. 
145 Case C-90/97, Swaddling, ECLI:EU:C:1999:96. 
146 The Housing Benefit (Habitual Residence) Amendment Regulations 2014, Regulation 2 amending 
Regulation 19(3)(b) of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006. 
147 The local housing allowance figures give an indication of acceptable rent levels for benefit recipients. The 
levels are usually well above the rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance leaving a big rent shortfall. 
148 To reduce immigration to the target of ‘tens of thousands’ would mean reducing immigration of EU 
workers.  
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4. Making it possible to rely on ‘obstacle’ case law in domestic courts  
While obstacles imposed by Member States on their own nationals seem harder to 
justify than indirect discrimination against non-nationals, especially in the context of 
jobseeking, that does not necessarily help the vast majority of potential claimants 
whose cases are dealt with solely by domestic courts. The concept of obstacles is 
arguably a little too nebulous and potentially limitless, without clear boundaries that 
national courts can get to grips with. There are no implementing pieces of legislation 
addressing obstacles to movement in domestic law in the UK, for example, whereas 
non-discrimination provisions find expression in domestic law as well as in directly 
effective EU law.  
There is a risk that the concept of an obstacle to movement is treated as a construct 
of soft rather than hard law, or as a ‘general principle’ difficult to rely on in court. 
National litigators are sometimes wary of challenging something as an obstacle where 
another challenge is possible, and courts are less comfortable with tackling obstacles 
than they are with tackling discrimination. It is not just the courts that struggle – 
legislatures are more likely to create measures that constitute obstacles, without 
necessarily considering whether they are justified, than they are to create measures 
that discriminate on the grounds of nationality, without first subjecting the measure to 
an equality impact assessment and providing grounds for objective justification at the 
time of enactment.  
An example here is the UK measure mentioned above, which has reinstated the pre-
Swaddling requirement for an appreciable period of residence for all claimants of 
Jobseeker’s Allowance – except this time it is longer, i.e. three months, instead of the 
old eight-week rule.149 This applies to UK nationals returning from the EU, having 
exercised their Treaty rights. The measure is symptomatic of the degree to which the 
concept of obstacles is rather neglected in the mind of the legislature.  
The Commission has a role to play, both by means of case work and by means of 
awareness-raising activities, in stressing to national legislatures and judiciaries the 
importance of the prohibition of obstacles to movement. This is especially important in 
the light of the new Enforcement Directive; Member States need to appreciate and 
implement the principles contained therein if they are to effectively enforce them.  
3.2.3 The distinction discrimination/obstacle impacting workers and non-
workers 
As noted above in the section on jobseekers, measures that are framed as impacting 
only on the ‘economically inactive’ can have significant effects upon the free 
movement of workers, constituting indirect discrimination and/or obstacles to that 
movement.  
The legitimate aim of requiring benefit claimants deemed not to be workers to have a 
degree of integration into society is unlikely to justify an obstacle to movement 
imposed on an own national. Instead, it is highly likely to permit a differentiated 
system of benefit entitlement as between non-nationals and EU nationals (so that the 
latter must be currently in work, or have permanent residence). This differentiation 
can and does impact upon workers in the following ways: 
(a) They create extra administrative hurdles that all EU migrants, workers or not, have 
to go through (whereas home State nationals do not) to demonstrate entitlement. 
These extra hurdles create more potential for delay, create additional evidential 
                                          
149 The Social Security (Jobseeker’s Allowance: Habitual Residence) Amendment Regulations 2013 SI 2013 
No 3196. 
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burdens for claimants, and more administrative complexity. Examples in the UK 
include the ‘more robust’ habitual residence test; the minimum earnings threshold and 
genuine and effective work test; the rules affecting retention of worker status, 
including the ‘compelling evidence of a genuine prospect of work test’ after six 
months.  
(b) They create a culture of distrust in which EU migrants, including workers, are 
perceived as potentially dishonest threats to the benefits system. The UK Treasury 
recently announced that all EU migrants, including workers, would be subjected to 
HMRC ‘Compliance checks’, which are otherwise undergone when there is a reason for 
suspecting that a claimant is not entitled to a benefit.150 This is direct discrimination 
and arguably contravenes Article 14(2) of Directive 2004/38, which states that 
Member States ‘may verify’ that the residence conditions are fulfilled “in specific cases 
where there is a reasonable doubt”. There must be some ground for reasonable doubt 
– not just the fact that someone is an EU national. The provision then adds that “this 
verification shall not be carried out systematically”. 
(c) Measures that provide for unequal access to benefits for those who become 
unemployed place EU migrant workers in a precarious situation whereby loss of 
worker status can mean the sudden loss of support. This precariousness impacts upon 
the lives and health of workers,151 and also makes them more vulnerable to 
exploitative employment, for fear of loss of worker status. Fear of entering into such a 
situation of precariousness – with the threat of homelessness – could create obstacles 
to the free movement of workers. 
(d) Persons performing migrant work may nevertheless be defined by national law as 
economically inactive, in the light of the potentially stringent approach outlined in the 
UK decision maker guidance on the Minimum Earnings Threshold and the status of 
part-time work. Those persons will then be subject to the benefit restrictions imposed 
on the economically inactive.  
Measures ostensibly targeting the economically inactive impact significantly upon 
workers in various ways, and constitute potentially ex ante obstacles to movement. 
Moreover, in the context of frontier workers, it seems that some degree of nationality 
discrimination akin to that applied to the economically inactive, is considered 
legitimate, as in Geven.152 There, a German child-raising allowance was limited to 
those resident in the territory, or else to those working full-time (more than ‘minor’ 
work). The CJEU gave the green light to the justificatory aim of awarding the benefit 
to those who “have established a real link with German society”.153 The fact that 
residence was not the only criterion, but frontier workers could get the benefit through 
“a substantial contribution to the national labour market”154 was sufficient to render 
the justification legitimate. The rule – performing more than minor work if not resident 
– was likely to disproportionately impact upon non-nationals, and in particular upon 
part-time workers, who are more likely to be women. This was, however, not explored 
by the CJEU. 
                                          
150 HM Government, Budget 2014: Policy costings (March 2014) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/295067/PU1638_policy_cos
tings_bud_2014_with_correction_slip.pdf, p. 49. 
151 See, for example, Bambra (2014); Bambra, Lunau et al (2014); Benach, Vives et al (2014). 
152 Case C-213/05, Geven, ECLI:EU:C:2007:438. 
153 Ibid, 22. 
154 Ibid, 25. 
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3.3 The impact of the distinction between discrimination and 
obstacles 
As we have seen above both the notion of discrimination and the notion of obstacle 
have been broadly construed and in many ways the notion of obstacle also 
encompasses the notion of discrimination. Consequently, if there is no sufficient 
evidence to argue discrimination, a rule might be challenged also as an obstacle.  
Furthermore, and because the notion of obstacle is broader than that of indirect 
discrimination, the CJEU does not always apply rigid differentiations. For instance in 
Haim I, the CJEU treated a language requirement as an obstacle,155 whilst under the 
Groener case law, as then confirmed in Angonese,156 the CJEU held language 
requirements to be indirectly discriminatory since own nationals are more likely to 
speak the official language than foreigners. Moreover, as said above in Terhoeve the 
CJEU found that since the rule is in any case an obstacle to movement, it was 
unnecessary to assess whether the rule was also discriminatory.157  
Whether a rule will be looked at under the lens of discrimination or obstacle will also 
depend on how the case has developed in the national court and what was claimed in 
that forum. In preliminary references the CJEU replies to the questions formulated by 
the national court. Hence, if the national court has used the notion of obstacle rather 
than the notion of discrimination, the CJEU might well maintain that choice. For this 
reason, the classification in the case law should not be considered excessively rigid: 
what matters at the end of the day is whether the rule has an effect on intra-
Community migration. If such an effect is found through either discrimination or a 
barrier to movement or an obstacle then the rule will have to be justified.  
As said above, the distinction between discriminatory and non-discriminatory obstacles 
is more fluid than what doctrinal writings might suggest. When considering whether a 
rule is compatible with Union law, the following should be taken into account: 
It is important to remember that the concept of discrimination in free movement law is 
radically different from the cognate concept in sex discrimination law. In particular in 
the latter, discrimination must be proven using statistical data as to the specific effects 
of the rule or practice on one of the sexes; or of the over/underrepresentation of one 
sex over the other in the area challenged. In the area of nationality discrimination that 
is not necessary – rather, and illustrated above, it is sufficient to show that the rule 
might affect more foreigners/migrants than nationals. The reason behind this 
discrepancy is that the very existence of rules might have prevented or discouraged 
foreigners from entering the employment market in the first place. Thus, it is sufficient 
to establish a narrative of discrimination (which is relatively easy for all those rules 
which contain a territorial element). 
Again, it should be remembered that in order to claim an obstacle it is sufficient to 
show that the rule might deter/discourage the free movement of workers; or might 
constitute a barrier to market access; again there is no particular evidence required. 
For this reason it is always advisable to claim both discrimination and obstacle (e.g. a 
rule that provides for a language requirement to be able to treat patients in the NHS is 
clearly discriminatory on grounds of nationality because it affects more foreigners than 
nationals; and in any event it is an obstacle in that it directly restricts access to the 
employment market).  
This said, some differences should be taken into account when deciding on litigation. 
                                          
155 C-424/97, Haim I, ECLI:EU:C:2000:357. 
156 Case C-281/98, Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296. 
157 Ibid, paragraph 41. 
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If a finding of discrimination can be supported by statistical data, then it will be very 
difficult for the Member State to defend such discrimination. A finding of discrimination 
is politically less problematic. This is so because if the CJEU finds discrimination, the 
Member State might amend the rules simply to remove that discrimination; whilst if 
the CJEU finds that the rule is an unjustified obstacle to movement the Member State 
will have to remove the rule for all economic operators. An example might illustrate 
the difference: a qualification requirement is indirectly discriminatory because 
nationals are more likely to have qualified in the Member State; in order to make the 
national rule compatible with EU law it will be sufficient for the Member State to avoid 
applying that particular rule to those who hold a qualification or equivalent experience 
from another Member State. If, however, the rule is found to be an obstacle to access 
to the employment market it will need to be lifted for all economic operators because 
it is not realistic for a Member State to accept that no qualification/experience is 
required if the worker is a foreigner or is returning upon migration, but qualification is 
required for own citizens.  
Thus, a qualification requirement will be an obstacle to access to the market justified, 
say, for the protection of the consumer (e.g. an architect), but in imposing that 
qualification the Member State cannot impose indirectly discriminatory criteria and 
therefore needs to recognise experience or qualifications obtained in another Member 
State. 
Once discrimination is established the Graf doctrine (effect of rule too remote and 
indirect) cannot be invoked: no matter how minimal the discrimination is, it always 
needs to be justified. 
On the other hand, the Member State might attempt to reverse a claim of 
discrimination with statistical data (albeit this would not be conclusive). One such 
attempt was made in the Gourmet case in relation to the free movement of goods. 
The case related to the prohibition of advertising alcoholic beverages in Sweden. The 
Swedish government claimed that the consumption of wine and whisky (both 
imported) had increased despite the advertising ban, whilst that of vodka (home-
produced) had decreased. The CJEU held that that fact was immaterial also because 
had the rule not been there the increase in consumption of imported beverages might 
have been greater.158  
As mentioned above there are inherent limits to the definition of ‘obstacle’ (those do 
not apply to discrimination). Therefore, a rule is not to be considered an obstacle: 
 
 If the rule is inherent in the organisation of the employment concerned 
(Lehthonen). This basically ensures that the free movement provisions cannot 
be used as a means to dispose of things such as selection criteria (in the case 
at issue for sporting activity, but this would apply to any selection). Thus, a 
selection criterion inherently limits participation in the labour market, and yet it 
does not need to be justified (unless discriminatory) as otherwise we would 
find ourselves in an impossible situation. Similarly, it may be argued that 
detention is inherent in the administration of justice and therefore cannot be 
challenged under the free movement provisions.  
 
 If the effect of the rule is too uncertain and indirect to be qualified as a barrier 
to movement (e.g. in Graf the claimant argued that the effect on free 
movement of a rule that provided for compensation for mandatory redundancy 
but not for voluntarily resignation was too remote and indirect to be qualified 
as a barrier) then the rule does not need to be justified.  
                                          
158 Case C-405/98, Konsumentombudsmannen v Gourmet International, ECLI:EU:C:2001:135, paragraph 
22. 
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3.4 Justification of discrimination and obstacles 
As mentioned above, the fact that a rule is found to be indirectly discriminatory or an 
obstacle does not exhaust the examination of the CJEU since the rule might be 
justified. In order to be justified the rule must: 
 pursue a legitimate aim, i.e. an aim compatible with Union law; 
 be necessary/appropriate to pursue that aim; 
 be proportionate, i.e. the restriction imposed on the free movement right; 
 and be commensurate to the importance of the policy pursue by the Member 
State. 
Legitimate aims 
As stated above, with the exception of protectionist aims, the CJEU tends to avoid 
challenging the legitimacy of the aims pursued by Member States, since it does not 
want to adjudicate on national policy priorities.159 Aims that pursue also an economic 
interest are not necessarily incompatible with European law: it is sufficient in this 
respect to recall the health care cases where the CJEU accepted that cost containing 
measures are compatible with Union law since their ultimate aim is to ensure welfare 
or health provision. 
Necessity/appropriateness and proportionality 
In several cases the CJEU does not carry out a separate assessment of necessity and 
proportionality, so that it would simply look at whether the measure is ‘appropriate’ 
and necessary to achieve the purported aim. For instance in Bosman, in relation to the 
transfer fee, after having found that the purported aim (ensuring some equality 
between clubs and the training of young players) was compatible with Union law, the 
CJEU went on to analyse whether the measures (imposition of transfer fees) were 
‘appropriate’. To that end the CJEU found that the rules at issue did not prevent the 
richest clubs from securing the best players, or the richest club from being able to 
spend more money. In relation to the second aim (training of young players), the 
CJEU found that whilst in theory the prospect of receiving a transfer fee would be 
likely to encourage football clubs to foster new talent, in practice the transfer fee was 
too speculative an event not commensurate with the actual cost of the training and 
therefore could not be a decisive factor in the decision to train young footballers or an 
adequate means to finance such training.  
So in many cases the assessment of the appropriateness/necessity of the measure is 
also used to assess whether the purported aim is in fact the real aim of the measure: 
if the measure is neither appropriate nor necessary then either the measure pursues 
no actual aim (e.g. that might be the case with measures that used to satisfy a policy 
need which is simply no longer there), or in fact pursues other (non-stated) aims.     
For instance in Lehtonen160 a rule which would have been justified otherwise, was 
found not justified because it was not overall consistent. In this case sporting rules 
imposed a deadline in order to field players for the basketball championship. Such a 
deadline was an obstacle falling within the scope of Article 45 TFEU, since it restricted 
the possibility of engaging players from other Member States where they had been 
                                          
159 Similarly in the context of goods see case C-231/83, Cullet, ECLI:EU:C:1985:29. 
160 Case C-176/96, Lehtonen, ECLI:EU:C:2000:201. 
 
 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
The notions of obstacle and discrimination under EU law 
on free movement of workers 
 
December 2014   44 
engaged after the specified date. The CJEU accepted that justificatory objectives of 
ensuring the proper functioning of sport competition, and considered that a measure 
preventing late transfers could speak to that objective by ensuring that the strength of 
the teams did not change substantially just before the end of the championship. 
However, players from a federation outside the Eurozone benefited from a later 
deadline. Thus, if non-EU players could be engaged at a later date without affecting 
the proper functioning of the championship, then there was no reason why players 
from the Eurozone could not also benefit from the extended deadline, so the rule went 
beyond what was necessary and was disproportionate.  
In more recent times, the scrutiny as to the necessity of measures has also focused on 
issues such as the coherence of the rule within the legal system (e.g. there is no point 
invoking the protection of workers in a small industry if workers in other industries are 
wholly unprotected); as well as an extensive analysis of the regulatory alternatives 
available to the Member States to minimise the obstacles to movement; and the 
manner in which the rule had been adopted.  
This is best illustrated by a series of cases decided within the context of the free 
movement of goods. In Commission v Austria (Brenner I),161 Austria had adopted 
restrictive measures for lorry traffic in part of the Brenner Motorway (one of the main 
transport arteries between the south and north of Europe). The CJEU found that whilst 
the aim invoked was of paramount importance to the EU (environmental protection), it 
had not been demonstrated in this case that the Austrian authorities had sufficiently 
studied whether reduction in carbon emissions could be achieved through means less 
restrictive of intra-EU transport. Furthermore, the CJEU also found that the speed at 
which the legislation had been implemented, leaving just two months between the 
adoption and entry into force of the restrictions, left insufficient time to economic 
operators to adapt. It is clear then that, insofar as new legislation is concerned, and 
especially when the effects on free movement are considerable, the Member States 
might be required to demonstrate to have taken all possible alternatives into account; 
to have based their decision on objective data; and to have given sufficient time to 
economic operators to adapt. This might be very important should governments seek 
to introduce new restrictions on e.g. the possibility to claim benefits or social 
advantages.  
In Commission v Austria (Brenner II),162 Austria again attempted to reduce traffic on 
the Brenner motorway by introducing a partial ban on transport on wheels of given 
goods, which were instead to be transported by rail. The CJEU considered very 
carefully whether the rules were necessary and it was eventually persuaded by the 
Commission’s contention that a permanent reduction in the speed limit would attain a 
similar effect in relation to the reduction of carbon emissions.  
In this respect, unpacking a piece of legislation to determine whether the restriction 
imposed on free movement is really necessary and proportionate might well highlight 
some inconsistencies in the policy framework of the Member State which might then 
determine the incompatibility of the rules with EU law. For the Member States this is a 
particular challenge not least since legal systems and policy initiatives within a State 
are hardly ever wholly coherent.  
The more traditional proportionality assessment, on the other hand, focuses very 
much on whether the restriction on the person’s freedom is out of proportion with the 
policy aim pursued. Proportionality proper is a very useful tool in the armoury of 
private claimants, and was of paramount importance in developing Union citizenship, 
especially in those cases, such as those concerning family reunification, where the rule 
itself might be legitimate but the application of the rule to that particular claimant is 
                                          
161 Case C-320/03, Commission v Austria (Brenner I), ECLI:EU:C:2005:684. 
162 Case C-28/09, Commission v Austria (Brenner II), ECLI:EU:C:2011:854.  
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disproportionate because of the hardship it would cause him or her. For instance in the 
above-mentioned case of Carpenter, it was the application of the British migration 
rules to those particular claimants that was inconsistent with their right of family life 
as protected by Union law. Proportionality proper is less useful in relation to the 
abstract review of legislation (as it is carried out in Commission proceedings) where 
rules can only be declared either compatible or incompatible with Union law without 
there been any possibility for an individual assessment. In those cases, the analysis 
would focus on whether the measure is appropriate and necessary as detailed above.  
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4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the legislative framework and of the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) shows that the personal and material scope of Article 45 
TFEU on the free movement of workers has been interpreted broadly. Under the 
protected EU nationals, it includes full-time, part-time, seasonal and frontier workers, 
working students and jobseekers. In combatting free movement breaches, the CJEU 
has also stretched the interpretation so as to incorporate as many obstructive rules as 
possible within its range of action. Consequently, at first glance, the functioning of the 
free movement of workers appears to be rather straightforward. 
 
However, deeper analysis reveals that there are still many grey zones and unclarities 
in delineating this fundamental freedom, all the more in the light of its importance for 
the implementation and effective realisation of the internal market and for the EU-
wide post-crisis efforts. The reported ambiguities surrounding the scope of this 
freedom call for further reflection and action. 
 
In this regard, the classification as a worker as well as the retention of the worker 
status are manifest problem areas. Although the CJEU has provided a workable 
definition of the former and the EU legislature has explicitly clarified the conditions and 
requirements for the latter, a substantial number of categories of persons remain in a 
precarious situation, threatened to ‘fall between stools’ (e.g. persons learning on the 
job, apprentices, persons in a low-paid or unpaid internship). In this respect, a gender 
perspective should be taken into account as well. Furthermore, these problems must 
be viewed against the background of the difficult labour market situation in many 
Member States as well as in view of the endeavours both of the European institutions 
and the Member States to tackle these challenges. In view of this, several EU 
nationals who are prima facie ‘worthy of protection’ lose the full protection they seem 
to be entitled to, taking into account the aims, the spirit and the ‘philosophy’ of the 
principle of free movement, in particular of workers. This state of affairs undoubtedly 
calls for a more detailed analysis of the limits of the free movement of workers. In 
such further clarification, the different aspects of the relationship between Article 45 
TFEU and the other areas of the free movement of persons, more specifically the free 
movement of Union citizens, is of particular interest. 
 
With regard to the types of measures that are contrary to Article 45 TFEU, the current 
legal framework also seems to complicate the exercise the Member States and the 
European Commission have to take up in order to trace measures having an adverse 
effect on intra-EU migration. A clearer conceptual framework based on discrimination 
on grounds of migration could be proposed as a possible solution. As a familiar 
concept on both national and EU level, such a new approach to discrimination may 
provide a clearer scenario for more and better compliance and may also be a catalyst 
to further define a list of key areas of action to counter remaining EU-incompatible 
national measures and practices. Crucial questions in this regard are if such a concept 
should be introduced and how it could be introduced into the legal framework of free 
movement. 
 
Anticipating a further case-to-case approach by the CJEU, the problematic areas 
tackled in the report should be proactively included in the strategy of the European 
Commission for the promotion of the free movement of workers, after further analysis 
and detection of the key fields of action. It fits well in the strategy of enforcing the 
freedom of movement of workers as devised in Directive 2014/54/EU of April 2014 
which must be implemented by the Member States in the next two years. It is self-
evident that all relevant stakeholders should be included in this exercise. 
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